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We investigate extensions of dependence logic with generalized quantifiers.
We also introduce and investigate the notion of a generalized atom. We
define a system of semantics that can accommodate variants of dependence
logic, possibly extended with generalized quantifiers and generalized atoms,
under the same umbrella framework. The semantics is based on pairs of
teams, or double teams. We also devise a game-theoretic semantics equiva-
lent to the double team semantics.
We make use of the double team semantics by defining a logic DC2, which
canonically fuses together two-variable dependence logic D2 and two-variable
logic with counting quantifiers FOC2. We establish that the satisfiability and
finite satisfiability problems of DC2 are complete for NEXPTIME.
1 Introduction
Independence-friendly logic is an extension of first-order logic motivated by
issues concerning Henkin quantifiers and game-theoretic semantics. Indepen-
dence-friendly logic, also known as IF-logic, was first defined in [10]. The
logic extends first-order logic FO by quantifiers of the type ∃x/{y1, ..., yk}.
The background intuition concerning the interpretion of these quantifiers is
that when a formula ∃x/{y1, ..., yk}ϕ is evaluated game-theoretically, then
the value of x is chosen in ignorance of the values of the variables y1, ..., yk.
While game-theoretic semantics of ordinary first-order logic gives rise to
a game of perfect information, the game for IF-logic is a game of imperfect
information. In [11], Hodges gave a compositional semantics for IF-logic.
While ordinary Tarskian semantics for first-order logic is based on evaluating
formulae with respect to single assignments (functions that give values to
variables in the domain of a model), the semantics of Hodges is based on
sets of assignments.
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In [28], Va¨a¨na¨nen introduced dependence logic, which provides a novel
alternative approach to issues concerning independence-friendly logic and
Henkin quantifiers. Instead of quantifiers of the type ∃x/{y1, ..., yk}, depen-
dence logic extends first-order logic by novel atomic expressions =(x1, ..., xk),
which state that the value of xk is determined by the values of x1, ..., xk−1.
The compositional semantics of dependence logic is similar to Hodges’ se-
mantics for IF-logic. The semantics is formulated in terms of sets of as-
signments. Va¨a¨na¨nen named such sets teams, and since then, the related
semantic framework has been called team semantics.
After the introduction of dependence logic, research on team semantics
has been very active, and a notably large number of related papers has
appeared in the course of a relatively short period. In addition to dependence
logic, several related logics have been introduced and studied.
Independence logic, introduced in [9], extends first-order logic with atoms
of the type x⊥ y. The intuitive meaning of this atom is that x and y are
independent of each other in the sense that nothing can be said about the
value of x based on the value of y, and vice versa. Independence logic even
allows for atoms x⊥z y, which state that the tuples x and y are independent
when the values of the variables in z are kept constant; see [9] for the formal
details.
In [6], Galliani introduces inclusion logic. This is yet a further variant of
dependence logic. This logic extends first-order logic by atoms of the type
x ⊆ y, which state that any tuple of values defined by x is also a tuple
of values defined by y. The article [6] also defines two separate systems of
team semantics, called strict and lax semantics. The systems differ from
each other in their treatment of the existential quantifier and disjunction.
In strict semantics, the existential quantifier is treated in the original way
familiar from dependence logic. A model A and a team X satisfy a formula
∃xϕ if and only if it is possible to extend1 each valuation s ∈ X with a pair
(x, a), where a ∈ Dom(A), such that the resulting extended team satisfies
ϕ. The key issue here is that each valuation s ∈ X is extended by exactly
one pair (x, a) that provides an interpretation of x. In lax semantics, each
assignment s ∈ X can be extended by more than one pair (x, a), resulting
in a whole set of extensions of the valuation s. For the technical difference
between the strict and lax semantics in their treatment of the disjunction,
see [6] or Section 3 below.
There are interesting and perhaps surprizing differences between the lax
and strict semantics. It is shown in [8] that with lax semantics, inclusion
logic is equiexpressive with positive greatest fixed point logic, and therefore
captuers PTIME in restriction to linearly ordered finite models. On the
other hand, with strict semantics, inclusion logic captures NP, as observed
1Strictly speaking, if the valuations in X already give an interpretation for x, then the
team X is modified by altering the assignments rather than extending them.
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in [7].
In addition to extensions of first-order logic with different kinds of atoms,
also generalized quantifiers have been studied in the context of team seman-
tics. In [3], Engstro¨m defines a semantics that can accommodate general-
ized quantifiers in the framework of team semantics. Inter alia, the article
[3] studies branching quantifiers consisting of partially ordered generalized
quantifiers. Investigations in the setting of [3] have been recently continued
for example in the articles [4] and [5].
In this article, we define a semantics that can deal with extensions of
dependence logic and its variants with generalized quantifiers. Our seman-
tics differs from the semantics given [3]. Our semantics is based on double
teams. There are several reasons—discussed below—why we believe that
the double team semantics is particularly natural, general, and useful.
The double team sematics we shall define is fully symmetric in the sense
that it respects obvious canonical duality principles concerning negation.
The double team semantics is also compositional for negation in a very
natural way. In investigations related to team semantics, the syntax of the
logic investigated is usually given in negation normal form. This means that
negations are only allowed in front of atomic formulae.2 In the framework of
double team semantics, such syntactic limitations are avoided in a natural
way.
In addition to the double team semantics, we also define a corresponding
canonical game-theoretic semantics, and prove its equivalence to the double
team semantics. The double team semantics, and its game theoretic coun-
terpart, provide a suitable setting for the definition of a notion of a minor
quantifier. This is a slight generalization of Lindstro¨m’s definition of a gen-
eralized quantifier in [22]. The notion of a minor quantifier nicely enables
the accommodation of the lax and strict interpretations of the existential
quantifier under the same umbrella framework.
The strict and lax interpretations of the existential quantifier canonically
give rise to two corresponding minor quantifiers. Furthermore, it turns out
that the ordinary existential quantifier gives rise to a third minor quantifier
different from the strict and lax quantifiers. The semantic framework based
on double teams provides a natural setting for the interpretation of the
meaning of the strict and lax quantifiers. In particular, the framework
enables the investigation of the relationship between ordinary generalized
quantifiers and the strict and lax quantifiers, thereby providing novel insight
into the nature of these formal tools that occupy an important role in the
current research in team semantics.
In addition to the notion of a minor quantifier, we introduce the notion
of a generalized atom. Generalized atoms can be used in order to declare
properties of (double) teams. The atoms =(x1, ..., xk), x⊥z y and x ⊆ y
2 In some cases non-first-order atoms cannot be negated at all.
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are examples of generalized atoms. In addition to minor quantifiers, the
double team semantics and its game-theoretic counterpart accommodate
generalized atoms under the same general system of semantics. Generalized
atoms have previously been briefly mentioned in [18] and defined in the
technical report [15].
Recent research in team semantics has revealed—as one perhaps could
expect—that subtle changes in semantic choices, such as using the lax se-
mantics instead the strict semantics, can give rise to logics with different
expressivities. To understand related phenomena better, it definitely makes
sense to study team semantics based systems in a general unified umbrella
framework.
In order to make direct use of the generality of the double team seman-
tics, we define the logic DC2, which extends two-variable dependence logic
D2 by counting quantifiers ∃≥k. We prove that the satisfiability problem of
this logic is decidable. In fact, we show that both the finite and standard
satisfiability problems of DC2 are NEXPTIME-complete.
The logic DC2 is an extension of both two-variable dependence logic
D2 and two-variable logic with counting FOC2. It was show in [25] that
the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of FOC2 are NEXPTIME-
complete. In [14], the corresponding problems for D2 were shown to also be
NEXPTIME-complete.
Research on two-variable logics is currently particularly active. Recent
articles in the field include for example [1, 2, 12, 13, 24, 27], and several oth-
ers. Mainly the related research has concerned decidability and complexity
issues in restriction to particlar classes of structures, and also questions
related to different built-in features and operators that increase the expres-
sivity of the base language. Team semantics has so far been discussed in
this context only in [14].
The article [14] discusses ordinary two-variable dependence logic D2,
which does not include counting quantifiers. In fact, when writing [14],
no direct semantics for counting quantifiers was available in the team se-
mantics framework.3 The double team appoach provides an appropriate
canonical system of semantics, and furthermore, facilitates the NEXPTIME-
completeness proof given below. Concerning the proof, our objective is not
so much to study the particular logic DC2. Instead, we wish to demon-
strate how the double team framework can in practise be used in order to
study fragments of team semantics based logics extended with generalized
quantifiers.
Our double team semantics provides a general system that can deal with
generalized quantifiers as well as generalized atoms, but on the face of it,
the move from single teams to double teams may seem like an undesirable
3Counting quantifiers are first-order definable, so indirect access to them would have
been possible.
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step towards a more complicated framework. We claim that this issue is not
so simple, for two reasons. Firstly, the syntax of most variants of depen-
dence logic is currently given in negation normal form, leading to systems
with more connectives and quantifiers than necessary. Disjunction and con-
junction have to be both included as primitive connectives in the logics, and
the same applies to the existential and universal quantifiers. This leads to
longer proofs. Secondly, we shall in fact briefly discuss below in Section 10 a
semantics which is rather similar to our double team semantics—facilitating
investigations analogous to those carried out in this article—but formulated
in terms of single teams.
Finally, it is worth noting that while the double team semantics can be
used in investigations related to dependence logic and its variants, it is also
a canonical semantics for ordinary extensions of first-order logic with gener-
alized quantifiers, i.e., extensions that do not include novel atomic formulae,
such as dependence atoms.
The structure of this article is as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we discuss
the necessary background definitions. In Section 4 we define the double
team semantics and discuss some of its basic properties. In Sections 5 and
6 we introduce and investigate generalized atoms and minor quantifiers.
In Section 7 we define a game-theoretic counterpart for the double team
semantics. We also show that the two systems of semantics are equivalent. In
Section 9 we investigate the logic DC2. In particular, we prove NEXPTIME-
completeness of the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of the
logic. In Section 10 we briefly discuss a single team semantics for generalized
quantifiers.
2 Preliminaries
Let Z+ denote the set of positive integers, and let VAR = { vi | i ∈ Z+ }
be the set of exactly all first-order variable symbols. We shall mainly use
metavariables x, y, z, x1, x2, etc., in order to refer to variable symbols in
VAR. We let x, y, z, x1, x2, etc., denote finite nonempty tuples of variable
symbols, i.e., tuples in VARn for some n ∈ Z+.
Let X ⊆ VAR be a finite, possibly empty set. Let A be a model with
the domain A. We do not allow for models to have an empty domain, so
A 6= ∅. A function f : X → A is called an assignment for the model A.
Let a be any finite nonempty tuple. We let a(k) denote the k-th member
of the tuple: for example (a, b)(1) = a and (a, b)(2) = b. When we write
u ∈ a, we mean that u is a member of the tuple a, i.e., if a = (a1, ..., an),
then u ∈ a iff u ∈ {a1, ..., an}. If f is a function mapping into some set S
k
of tuples of the length k ∈ Z+, then fi denotes the function with the same
domain as f defined such that
fi(x) =
(
f(x)
)
(i),
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i.e., fi is the i-th coordinate function of f .
Let s be an assignment with the domain X and for the model A. Let
n ∈ Z+. Let x ∈ VAR
n be a finite nonempty tuple of variables, and let a ∈
An. Assume that if x repeats a variable, then a repeats the corresponding
value, i.e., if x(i) = x(j) for some i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, then a(i) = a(j). We say
that a respects x-repetitions. We let s[x/a] denote the variable assignment
for A with the domain X ∪ { x | x ∈ x } defined as follows.
1. s[x/a](y) = a(k) if y = x(k),
2. s[x/a](y) = s(y) if y 6∈ x.
Let T ∈ P(An), where P denotes the power set operator. Assume that each
tuple in T respects x-repetitions. We define
s[x/T ] = { s[x/a ] | a ∈ T }.
Note that s[x/∅ ] = ∅. Let S be a set and z a tuple of variables of the length
k ∈ Z+. If T ⊆ S
k is a relation such each u ∈ T respects z-repetitions, then
we say that the relation T respects z-repetitions.
Let X ⊆ VAR be a finite, possibly empty set of first-order variable
symbols. Let U be a set of assignments f : X → A. Such a set U is a team
with the domain X and for the model A. The domain A of the model A
is a codomain of the team U . Note that the empty set is a team for A, as
is the set {∅} containing only the empty variable assignment. The team ∅
does not have a unique domain; any finite subset of VAR is a domain of ∅.
The domain of the team {∅} is ∅.
A pair of teams (U, V ) is a double team if U and V are teams with the
same domain; the pairs (U, ∅), (∅, V ) are double teams when U and V are
teams.
Let V be a nonempty team with the domain X and for the model A.
Let n ∈ Z+, and let S ⊆ A
n. Let f : V → P(S) be a function, where P
denotes the power set operator. Let x = (x1, ..., xn) be a tuple of variables.
Assume that for each s ∈ V , the relation f(s) respects x-repetitions. Then
we say that f respects x-repetitions. We define
V [x/f ] =
⋃
s∈V
s[x/f(s) ].
(Note that if we have V = ∅, then V [x/f ] = ∅.) Let B denote the set
{ a ∈ An | a respects x-repetitions }. We let f ′ : V → P(B) denote the
function defined such that f ′(s) = B \ f(s) for all s ∈ V . Naturally
V [x/f ′ ] =
⋃
s∈V
s[x/f ′(s) ].
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Let V be a team with the domain X and for the model A. Let k ∈ Z+.
Let y1, ..., yk be variable symbols. Assume that {y1, ..., yk} ⊆ X. Define
Rel
(
V,A, (y1, ..., yk)
)
= {
(
s(y1), ..., s(yk)
)
| s ∈ V }.
If V is empty, then the obtained relation is the empty relation. Occa-
sionally, when the model A is clear from the context, we simply write
Rel
(
V, (y1, ..., yk)
)
instead of Rel
(
V,A, (y1, ..., yk)
)
.
Let (i1, ..., in) be a non-empty sequence of positive integers. A gener-
alized quantifier (cf. [22]) of the type (i1, ..., in) is a class C of structures
(A,B1, ..., Bn) such that the following conditions hold.
1. A 6= ∅.
2. For each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, we have Bj ⊆ A
ij .
3. If (A′, B′1, ..., B
′
n) ∈ C and if there is an isomorphism f : A
′ → A′′
from (A′, B′1, ..., B
′
n) to another structure (A
′′, B′′1 , ..., B
′′
n), then we
have (A′′, B′′1 , ..., B
′′
n) ∈ C.
Let Q be a generalized quantifier of the type (i1, ..., in). We let Q denote
the generalized quantifier of the type (i1, ..., in) defined such that
Q = { (A,C1, ..., Cn) | (A,C1, ..., Cn) 6∈ Q }.
Let A be a model with the domain A. We define QA to be the set
{ (B1, ..., Bn) | (A,B1, ..., Bn) ∈ Q }.
Similarly, we define
Q
A
= { (B1, ..., Bn) | (A,B1, ..., Bn) ∈ Q }.
If ϕ is a formula of first-order logic, possibly extended with generalized
quantifiers, we write A, s |=FO ϕ when the model A satisfies ϕ under the
assignment s. The related semantic clause for generalized quantifiers is as
follows.
Let Q denote a generalized quantifier of the type (i1, ..., in). Consider
expressions of the type Qx1, ..., xn(ϕ1, ..., ϕn), where xj is a tuple of variables
of the length ij , and ϕj is a formula of first-order logic, possibly extended
with generalized quantifiers. Let A be a model with domain A and s an
assignment with codomain A. If x is a tuple of variables of the length
k ∈ Z+, we let A
k[x] denote the set of exactly all tuples in Ak that respect x-
repetitions. We define A, s |=FO Qx1, ..., xn(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff
(
A,S1, ..., Sn
)
∈
QA, where Sj = { a ∈ A
ij [xj] | A, s[xj/a] |=FO ϕj }. The quantifier
Qx1, ..., xn binds the variables xj in the formula ϕj . We of course assume
that s interprets all the free variables in the formula Qx1, ..., xn(ϕ1, ..., ϕn),
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and that A interprets the non-logical symbols that appear in the formulae
ϕ1, ..., ϕn.
Below, once we have defined the notion of a minor quantifier, we occa-
sionally call generalized quantifiers ordinary generalized quantifiers.
In the investigations below, each instance of a subformula of a formula
ϕ is considered to be a distinct subformula: for example, in the formula
(P (x)∨P (x)), the left and right instances of the formula P (x) are considered
to be two distinct subformulae of the formula (P (x) ∨ P (x)). It is not
important how this distinction is achieved formally.
We let SUBϕ denote the set of subformulae of ϕ. For example the set
SUB(P (x)∨P (x)) has three subformulae in it, the formula (P (x) ∨ P (x)) and
both instances of P (x).
We consider only models with a purely relational vocabulary, without
function symbols or constant symbols. When we informally leave brackets
unwritten in formulae, the order of priority of binary connectives is such
that ∧ is first, and then come ∨,→ and↔, in the given order. The notation
A, [x 7→ a, y 7→ b] |= ϕ means that A, s |= ϕ when s is an assignment whose
domain is {x, y}, and it holds that s(x) = a and s(y) = b.
3 Dependence logic and its variants
Let τ be a vocabulary containing relation symbols only. Let A(τ) be the
smallest set T such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. Let x1 and x2 be (not necessarily distinct) variable symbols. Then
x1 = x2 ∈ T .
2. Let k be a positive integer. If R ∈ τ is a k-ary relation symbol
and x1, ..., xk are (not necessarily distinct) variable symbols, then
R(x1, ..., xk) ∈ T .
3. Let k be a positive integer. If x1, ..., xk are (not necessarily distinct)
variable symbols, then =(x1, ..., xk) ∈ T .
Formulae formed by the rules 1 and 2 above are called first-order atoms.
The set of τ -formulae of dependence logic D is the smallest set T such that
the following conditions hold.
1. A(τ) ⊆ T .
2. If ϕ ∈ A(τ), then ¬ϕ ∈ T .
3. If ϕ,ψ ∈ T , then (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ T .
4. If ϕ,ψ ∈ T , then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ T .
5. If ϕ ∈ T and z ∈ VAR, then ∃z ϕ ∈ T .
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6. If ϕ ∈ T and z ∈ VAR, then ∀z ϕ ∈ T .
Two-variable dependence logic D2 is a fragment of D. Let σ be a vocab-
ulary containing relation symbols only. Assume each symbol in σ is either
of the arity 1 or 2. Fix two distinct variable symbols x and y. The set A(σ)
of atomic σ-formulae of D2 is the smallest set T defined as follows.
1. Assume P ∈ σ and R ∈ σ are unary and binary relation symbols,
respectively. Let z, z′ ∈ {x, y} be (not necessarily distinct) variables.
Then P (z) ∈ T and R(z, z′) ∈ T .
2. Let z, z′ ∈ {x, y} be (not necessarily distinct) variables. Then we have
=(z) ∈ T and =(z, z′) ∈ T . Also z = z′ ∈ T .
The set of σ-formulae of D2 is the smallest set T satisfying the following
conditions.
1. A(σ) ⊆ T .
2. If ϕ ∈ A(σ), then ¬ϕ ∈ T .
3. If ϕ,ψ ∈ T , then (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ T .
4. If ϕ,ψ ∈ T , then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ T .
5. If ϕ ∈ T and z ∈ {x, y}, then ∃z ϕ ∈ T .
6. If ϕ ∈ T and z ∈ {x, y}, then ∀z ϕ ∈ T .
We next define the sematics of D. In the definition, A denotes a model and
U a team. The domain of the team U is always assumed to contain the
free variables in the formulae, and the codomain of U is of course assumed
to be the domain A of the model A. Furthermore, it is assumed that the
vocabulary of the model A contains the non-logical symbols in the formulae.
The following clauses define the semantics of D.
A |=U x1 = x2 ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO x1 = x2
)
.
A |=U R(x1, ..., xm) ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO R(x1, ..., xm)
)
.
A |=U =(x1, ..., xm) ⇔ if there exist assignments s, t ∈ U such that
s(xi) = t(xi) for all i ∈ {1, ...,m} \ {m},
then we have s(xm) = t(xm).
A |=U ¬x1 = x2 ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s 6|=FO x1 = x2
)
.
A |=U ¬R(x1, ..., xm) ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s 6|=FO R(x1, ..., xm)
)
.
A |=U ¬ =(y1, ..., ym) ⇔ U = ∅.
A |=U (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ A |=U1 ϕ and A |=U2 ψ for some
U1, U2 ⊆ U such that U1 ∪ U2 = U.
A |=U (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ A |=U1 ϕ and A |=U2 ψ.
A |=U ∃z ϕ ⇔ A |=U [z/f ] ϕ for some f : U → A.
A |=U ∀z ϕ ⇔ A |=U [z/A] ϕ.
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Notice that A |=U =(z) iff either U = ∅ or s(z) = s
′(z) for all s, s′ ∈ U .
Formulae of D that do not contain instances of atoms =(x1, ..., xk) are called
first-order formulae. It is well-known and easy to show that for first-order
formulae, A |=U ϕ iff we have A, s |=FO ϕ for all s ∈ U .
Variants of dependence logic studied in the current literature include for
example inclusion logic [6]. The syntax of inclusion logic is the same as that
of dependence logic, with the exception that instead of atomic expressions
=(x1, ..., xm), the non-first-order atoms in inclusion logic are inclusion atoms
(y1, ..., yk) ⊆ (z1, ..., zk), and negated inclusion atoms are not allowed.
Inclusion atoms are interpreted such that A |=U (y1, ..., yk) ⊆ (z1, ..., zk)
iff Rel
(
U, (y1, ..., yk)
)
⊆ Rel
(
U, (z1, ..., zk)
)
. The existential quantifier is in-
terpreted such that A |=U ∃z ϕ iff A |=U [x/S] ϕ for some non-empty set
S ⊆ Dom(A). Other semantic clauses are exactly the same as the ones
given for dependence logic above. This results in the interpretation of in-
clusion logic with lax semantics.
Inclusion logic can also be interpreted using strict semantics. The dif-
ference with lax semantics is the interpretation of the existential quantifier
and disjunction. For the existential quantifier, the semantic clause is exactly
the same as that given for dependence logic above. For the disjunction, the
semantic clause dictates that A |=U ϕ∨ψ iff we have A |=U1 ϕ and A |=U2 ψ
for some teams U1, U2 ⊆ U such that U1 ∪ U2 = U and U1 ∩ U2 = ∅.
It is established in [8] that with lax semantics, inclusion logic is equiex-
pressive with the positive greatest fixed point logic, and therefore captures
PTIME in restriction to ordered finite models. With strict semantics, inclu-
sion logic captures NP, as observed in [7].
Also independence logic [9] is a widely studied variant of dependence
logic. For formal details related to independence logic, see [9].
4 A double team semantics
In ordinary team semantics, the background intuition4 concerning the sat-
isfaction of formulae is that a team satisfies a formula ϕ iff every member
of the team satisfies ϕ. In the double team semantics, the background intu-
ition is that a double team (U, V ) satisfies a formula iff every assignment in
the team U satisfies the formula, and furthermore, every assignment in the
team V falsifies the formula. Both in ordinary and double team semantics,
the intuition is actually even formally valid when the investigated formula
is a first-order formula.
The truth definition for first-order atoms and connectives is as follows.
4Intuition only!
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A, (U, V ) |= y1 = y2 ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO y1 = y2
)
and
∀s ∈ V
(
A, s 6|=FO y1 = y2
)
.
A, (U, V ) |= R(y1, ..., ym) ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO R(y1, ..., ym)
)
and
∀s ∈ V
(
A, s 6|=FO R(y1, ..., ym)
)
.
A, (U, V ) |= ¬ϕ ⇔ A, (V,U) |= ϕ.
A, (U, V ) |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ A, (U1, V ) |= ϕ and A, (U2, V ) |= ψ for
some U1, U2 ⊆ U such that U1 ∪ U2 = U.
The background intuition concerning the satisfaction of a quantified for-
mula Qxϕ(x) is based on the idea that the set of witnesses of Qxϕ(x) is
the set of exactly all values b such that ϕ(b) holds. A proper subset will
not do. This intuition easily generalizes to concern generalized quantfiers Q
of arbitrary types. For a generalized quantifier Q of the type (i1, ..., in), we
define
A, (U, V ) |= Qx1, ..., xn(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)
if and only if there exist functions f : U → QA and g : V → Q
A
such that
A,
(
U [x1/f1] ∪ V [x1/g1 ], U [x1/f1
′ ] ∪ V [x1/g1
′ ]
)
|= ϕ1,
...
A,
(
U [xn/fn] ∪ V [xn/gn ], U [xn/fn
′ ] ∪ V [xn/gn
′ ]
)
|= ϕn.
The functions f and g must have the property that for each i ∈ {1, ..., n},
the coordinate functions fi and gi (and thereby also the functions f
′
i and g
′
i)
respect xi-repetitions.
Notice that if W = ∅ is the empty team and f : W → QA the empty
function (f = ∅), then W [x/f ] = ∅.
Proposition 4.1. Let ϕ be a formula of first-order logic, possibly extended
with generalized quantifiers. Let (U, V ) be a double team. Then
A, (U, V ) |= ϕ iff ∀s ∈ U∀t ∈ V
(
A, s |=FO ϕ and A, t 6|=FO ϕ
)
.
Proof. The claim is established by a straightforward induction on the struc-
ture of formulae.
When ϕ is a sentence, we define A |= ϕ iff A, ({∅}, ∅) |= ϕ. When A is
known from the context, we may write (U, V ) |= ψ instead of A, (U, V ) |= ψ.
Note that the truth definition of disjunction could be easily modified
without sacrificing Proposition 4.1. For example we could define A, (U, V ) |=
ϕ ∨ ψ iff A, (U1, V ∪ U
′
1) |= ϕ and A, (U2, V ∪ U
′
2) |= ψ for some U1, U2 ⊆ U
such that U1 ∪ U2 = U ; here U
′
1 = U \ U1 and U
′
2 = U \ U2. This defini-
tion would perhaps be a better match with our truth definition concerning
generalized quantifiers. For the sake of simplicity, we shall mostly ignore
such alternative definitions for connectives in this article. However, let us
define the connective ∨s such that A, (U, V ) |= ϕ∨s ψ iff A, (U1, V ) |= ϕ and
A, (U2, V ) |= ψ for some U1, U2 ⊆ U such that U1∪U2 = U and U1∩U2 = ∅.
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5 Generalized atoms
Let m and n be non-negative integers such that n + m > 0. Let Q be a
generalized quantifier of the type (i1, ..., in+m). Consider atomic expressions
of the type
AQ,n(y1, ..., yn ; yn+1, ..., yn+m),
where each yj is a tuple of variables of the length ij , and AQ,n is simply a
symbol. Extend the double team semantics such that
A, (U, V ) |= AQ,n(y1, ..., yn ; yn+1, ..., yn+m)
if and only if
(
Rel(U,A, y1), ...,Rel(U,A, yn),Rel(V,A, yn+1), ...,Rel(V,A, yn+m)
)
∈ QA.
The generalized quantifier Q and the number n define a generalized atom of
the type (
(i1, ..., in), (in+1, ..., in+m)
)
.
Note that types of generalized quantifiers are tuples and types of gener-
alized atoms are pairs of tuples; exactly one tuple of such a pair of tuples
can be the empty tuple. (We do not bother ourselves with generalized atoms
of the type (∅; ∅) or generalized quantifiers of the type ∅.)
We occasionally call generalized atoms non-first-order atoms, while other
atoms are first-order atoms.
6 Minor quantifiers
In this section we generalize the notion of a generalized quantifier by Lind-
stro¨m in [22]. This way we obtain a framework that can naturally accom-
modate in a single umbrella framework the different kinds of semantics for
the existential quantifier in the literature on dependence logic and its later
variants.
Minor quantifiers have a natural intuitive interpretation. The interpre-
tation will be discussed in Section 7, where we define the game-theoretic
counterpart for the double team semantics.
Let Q be a generalized quantifier of the type (1). Let C be a class of
structures (A,B+, B−) such that the following conditions hold.
1. A 6= ∅.
2. B+ ⊆ A and B− ⊆ A.
3. B+ ∩B− = ∅.
4. If (C,D+,D−) ∈ C and if there is an isomorphism f : C → E from
(C,D+,D−) to another structure (E,F+, F−), then (E,F+, F−) ∈ C.
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5. For each (A,B+, B−) ∈ C, there exists a pair (A,H) ∈ Q such that
B+ ⊆ H and B− ⊆ A \H.
6. If (A,B+, B−) ∈ C, there does not exist a pair (A,H) ∈ Q such that
B+ ⊆ H and B− ⊆ A \H.
7. For each (A,H) ∈ Q, there exists a tuple (A,B−, B−) ∈ C such that
B+ ⊆ H and B− ⊆ A \H.
We say that C witnesses Q.
Consider a pair (C,D) such that C witnesses Q and D witnesses Q. Here
Q is a quantifier of the type (1). The pair (C,D) defines aminor quantifier of
the type (1). (For the sake of simplicity, we shall not define minor quantifiers
of any other type.) Let M = (C,D). We call M a minor of Q. We write
M ≤ Q.
A possible intuitive interpretation concerning the relationship between
Q and the minor quantifier M is that in order to verify Qxϕ(x) in a model
A, one does not necessarily have to be able to find the set B ∈ QA such
that b ∈ B iff ϕ(b) holds in A. Dependening on the quantifier Q, it may
be enough to find some smaller set B+ ⊆ B of values that verify ϕ(x),
possibly together with a set B− ⊆ Dom(A) \B of falsifying values. A tuple
(A,B+, B−) ∈ C then provides the sets B+ and B−. On the other hand, to
falsify a formula Qxψ(x), it suffices to find a tuple (A,E+, E−) in D, where
E+ is a set of verifying and E− a set of falsifying values for ψ(x).
Therefore minor quantifiers provide a generalized perspective on gener-
alized quantifiers. The perspective in some intuitive sense deals with issues
concerning the constructive verification and falsification of formulae.
The semantics of minor quantifiers will be highly analogous to that of
ordinary generalized quantifiers. To make this issue explicit, let us fix some
notational conventions.
Let M = (C,D) be a minor quantifier. Let A be a model with the
domain A. Define MA = { (B+, B−) | (A,B+, B−) ∈ C } and M
A
=
{ (B+, B−) | (A,B+, B−) ∈ D }. Let U be a team and f : U → M
A a
function. When discussing the semantics of minor quantifiers M = (C,D),
we let U [x/f ] denote the team U [x/f1], while U [x/f
′] denotes the team
U [x/f2]. Similarly, if V is a team and g : V →M
A
a function, we let V [x/g]
denote the team U [x/g1] and U [x/g
′] the team U [x/g2]. This convention
makes the connection between ordinary generalized quantifiers and minor
quantifiers fully explicit. All related arguments will be carefully developed
below, so no notational confusion arises.
Let M be a minor quantifier of the type (1). Consider expressions of the
type Mxϕ. Extend the double team semantics such that A, (U, V ) |=Mxϕ
iff there exists functions f : U →MA and g : V →M
A
such that
A,
(
U [x/f ] ∪ V [x/g ], U [x/f ′ ] ∪ V [x/g ′ ]
)
|= ϕ.
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Notice that the form of the above semantic clause is now the same as in the
case of ordinary quantifiers of the type (1).
The following proposition is easy to establish.
Proposition 6.1. Let Q be a generalized quantifier and M ≤ Q a minor
quantifier. Let ϕ be a formula of first-order logic extended with any collection
of minor quantifiers and ordinary generalized quantifiers. Let ϕ′ be a formula
obtained from ϕ by replacing any occurrence of Q by M , or alternatively,
any occurrence of M by Q. Then A, (U, V ) |= ϕ iff A, (U, V ) |= ϕ′.
Let Q be a generalized quantifier of the type (1). Notice that Q canoni-
cally defines the minor quantifier
MQ :=
(
{ (A,B,A \B) | (A,B) ∈ Q }, { (A,B,A \B) | (A,B) ∈ Q }
)
,
whose semantics is equivalent to that ofQ in the double team framework. We
can replace any instance of Q by MQ (or vice versa) in any formula ϕ, and
exactly the same models and double teams will satisfy the two formulae.5 We
call MQ the minor quantifier defined by Q. Ordinary generalized quantifiers
can therefore be seen as special cases of minor quantifiers.
Define the strict existential quantifier ∃s to be the minor quantifier
(C,D), where C contains exactly all triples (A,B,C) such that A is a nonempty
set, B ⊆ A is a singleton set, and C = ∅, while D contains exactly all triples
(D,E,F ) such that D is a nonempty set, E = ∅, and F = D. Define the
lax existential quantifier ∃l to be the minor quantifier (C,D), where C con-
tains exactly all triples (A,B,C) such that A is a nonempty set, B ⊆ A is
a nonempty set, and C = ∅, while D contains exactly all triples (D,E,F )
such that D is a nonempty set, E = ∅, and F = D. Note that neither ∃s nor
∃l is equal to the minor quantifier M∃ defined by the ordinary existential
quantifier.
7 Game-theoretic semantics
In this section we define a natural game-theoretic semantics for first-order
logic extended with all ordinary generalized quantifiers of type (1), all mi-
nor quantifiers of type (1), and all generalized atoms. We only deal with
quantifiers of the type (1) in the rest of the article for the sake of simplicity.
Strictly speaking, we could of course avoid discussing ordinary general-
ized quantifiers here, but we shall discuss them anyway since it makes the
exposition of the background intuitions behind the game-theoretic semantics
particularly transparent.
Let A be a model with the domain A. Let s be an assignment that maps
a finite set of first-order variable symbols into A. We define a semantic
5The formula ϕ can indeed belong to any extension of first order logic with ordinary
generalized quantifiers, minor quantifiers, and generalized atoms.
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game G(A, s,#, ϕ), where # ∈ {+,−} is a symbol and ϕ a formula. Here
we assume that the assignment s interprets all the free variables in ϕ.
The game is played by an agent A against an interrogator I. The intu-
ition is that the interrogator poses questions, and the agent tries to answer
them. In a game G(A, s,+, ϕ), the agent’s task is to maintain that ϕ holds,
while in a game G(A, s,−, ϕ), the agent’s task is to maintain that ϕ does
not hold.
A play of the game G(A, s,#, ϕ) begins from the position (A, s,#, ϕ).
All positions of the game are tuples of the form (A, t,#, ψ), where t is a
finite assignment for A, # ∈ {+,−}, and ψ is a subformula of ϕ.
Assume that we have reached a position (A, t,#,¬ψ) in a play of the
game. The play of the game continues from the position (A, t,#, ψ), where
# ∈ {+,−} \ {#}.
Assume a position (A, t,+, ψ ∨ψ′) has been reached. Then the player A
chooses exactly one of the sets {ψ,ψ′}, {ψ}, {ψ′}. If A chooses {ψ,ψ′}, then
I chooses a formula χ ∈ {ψ,ψ′}, and the play continues from the position
(A, t,+, χ). If A chooses {ψ}, then the play of the game continues from the
position (A, t,+, ψ). If A chooses {ψ′}, then the play continues from the
position (A, t,+, ψ′).6 The background intuition concerning the disjunction
rule is that A makes one of the following three claims.
1. Both ψ and ψ′ hold.
2. At least ψ holds.
3. At least ψ′ holds.
If a position (A, t,−, ψ ∨ ψ′) has been reached, the player I chooses one
of the positions (A, t,−, ψ) and (A, t,−, ψ′). The play of the game then
continues from the position chosen by I.
Assume we have reached a position (A, t,+, Qxψ) in the game, where
Q is an ordinary generalized quantifier. The play of the game continues as
follows.
1. In the case QA is empty, the play ends in the position (A, t,+, Qxψ),
and we say that the player A does not survive the play of the game.
Otherwise, the player A chooses a set S ∈ QA. The background intu-
ition is that A claims that S is the set of exactly all values for x in A
that verify ψ.
6 Consider the connective ∨s defined in Section 4. We can add this connective into
the language considered. The rules for a position (A, t,+, ψ ∨s ψ′) are exactly as for
(A, t,+, ψ ∨ ψ′), but with the exception that the choice {ψ,ψ′} by A is not allowed. The
rules for a position (A, t,−, ψ ∨s ψ′) are the same as for a position (A, t,−, ψ ∨ ψ′). As
the reader can easily check, Theorem 7.1 below goes through even when the language is
extended by ∨s. We could consider further connectives and even define a natural notion
of a minor connective, but we shall not do that for the sake of brevity.
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2. Then the player I chooses either the set S chosen by A, or its com-
plement A \ S.
(a) If I chooses S, then I also chooses an element b ∈ S, and the
play of the game continues from the position (A, t[x/b],+, ψ). In
this case the intuition is that the player I is opposing the claim
that b verifies ψ. If S = ∅ and I chooses S, the play of the game
ends in the position (A, t,+, Qxψ), and the player A survives the
play of the game
(b) If I chooses A \S, then I also chooses an element b ∈ A \S. The
play of the game continues from the position (A, t[x/b],−, ψ).
The intuition is that the player I is opposing the claim that b
falsifies ψ. If I chooses A\S and A\S = ∅, the play of the game
ends in the position (A, t,+, Qxψ), and the player A survives the
play of the game.
Assume we have reached a position (A, t,−, Qxψ) in a play of the game,
where Q is an ordinary generalized quantifier. The play continues as follows.
1. In the case Q
A
is empty, the play of the game ends in the position
(A, t,−, Qxψ), and the player A does not survive the play of the game.
Otherwise, the player A chooses a set S ∈ Q
A
. The intuition is that
the player A claims that S is the set of exactly all values for x that
verify ψ, while S 6∈ QA.
2. The player I then chooses either the set S chosen by A or its comple-
ment A \ S.
(a) If I chooses S, then I also chooses an element b ∈ S, and the play
of the game continues from the position (A, t[x/b],+, ψ). In this
case the intuition is that the player I is opposing the claim that
b verifies ψ. If I chooses S and S = ∅, the play of the game ends
ends in the position (A, t,−, Qxψ), and the player A survives the
play of the game.
(b) If I chooses A \S, then I also chooses an element b ∈ A \S. The
game continues from the position (A, t[x/b],−, ψ). The intuition
is that the player I is opposing the claim that b falsifies ψ. If
I chooses A \ S and A \ S = ∅, the play ends in the position
(A, t,−, Qxψ), and the player A survives the play of the game.
Assume we have reached a position (A, t,+,Mxψ) in the game, where
M is a minor quantifier. The play of the game continues as follows.
1. In the case MA is empty, the play ends in the position (A, t,+,Mxψ),
and we say that the player A does not survive the play of the game.
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Otherwise, the player A chooses a pair (S, T ) ∈ MA. The intuition
is that S and T are sets of values for x, witnessing and falsifying ψ,
respectively. In other words, the player A claims that assignments
in t[x/S] satisfy ψ, while assignments in t[x/T ] falsify ψ. A further
piece of the background intuition of course is that providing such a
pair (S, T ) is sufficient for the verification of Mxψ.
2. Then the player I chooses either the set S or the set T .
(a) If I chooses S, then I also chooses an element b ∈ S, and the
play of the game continues from the position (A, t[x/b],+, ψ). In
this case the intuition is that the player I is opposing the claim
that b verifies ψ. If S = ∅ and I chooses S, the game ends in
the position (A, t,+,Mxψ), and the player A survives the play
of the game.
(b) If I chooses T , then I also chooses an element b ∈ T . The play
of the game continues from the position (A, t[x/b],−, ψ). The
intuition is that the player I is opposing the claim that b falsifies
ψ. If T = ∅ and I chooses T , the game ends in the position
(A, t,+,Mxψ), and the player A survives the play of the game.
Assume we have reached a position (A, t,−,Mxψ) in a play of the game,
where M is a minor quantifier. The play continues as follows.
1. In the case M
A
is empty, the play of the game ends in the position
(A, t,−,Mxψ), and the playerA does not survive the play of the game.
Otherwise, the player A chooses a pair (S, T ) ∈ M
A
. The intuition
is that that S and T are sets of values witnessing and falsifying ψ,
respectively, and supplying such a pair (S, T ) is enough to falsifyMxψ.
2. The player I then chooses either the set S or the set T .
(a) If I chooses S, then I also chooses an element b ∈ S, and the
play of the game continues from the position (A, t[x/b],+, ψ).
The intuition is that the player I is opposing the claim that b
verifies ψ. If I chooses S and S = ∅, the play of the game ends in
the position (A, t,−,Mxψ), and the player A survives the play
of the game.
(b) If I chooses T , then I also chooses an element b ∈ T . The
game continues from the position (A, t[x/s],−, ψ). The intuition
is that the player I is opposing the claim that b falsifies ψ. If I
chooses T and T = ∅, the play of the game ends in the position
(A, t,−,Mxψ), and the player A survives the play of the game.
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If ψ is an atomic first-order formula, and a position (A, t,+, ψ) is reached
in a play of the game, then A survives the play of the game if A, t |=FO ψ.
If A, t 6|=FO ψ, then A does not survive the play. If a position (A, t,−, χ) is
reached, where χ is an atomic first-order formula, then A survives the play
of the game if A, t 6|=FO χ. If A, t |=FO χ, then A does not survive the play.
If a position (A, t,+, ψ) or (A, t,−, ψ) is reached, where ψ is a generalized
atom, then A survives the play. When a position with an atomic formula is
reached, the play of the game ends.
Let U and V be teams with the same domain. Assume the domain
contains the free variables of ϕ. A play of the game G(A, U, V, ϕ) is played
by A and I such that I picks a beginning position (A, s,+, ϕ) or (A, t,−, ϕ),
where s ∈ U and t ∈ V . The play then proceeds according to the rules
discussed above. If U = V = ∅, and therefore I cannot choose a beginning
position, then A survives the unique play of the game. In this case no end
position in the play of the game is generated.
Let F be a strategy of A for the game G(A, U, V, ϕ); a strategy of A
is simply a function that provides a unique choice for A in every possible
position of the game that requires a choice. The domain of F is the set of
positions in the game G(A, U, V, ϕ) that can be reached in some play of the
game, and require a choice by A. In a position of the type (A, t,#,Kxψ), if
KA is empty, then the function F is undefined on the input (A, t,#,Kxψ).
Hence F does not provide any move for A in such a position. Here K can
be a minor quantifier or an ordinary generalized quantifier.
Let S be the set of assignments t such that some play, where A plays
according to the strategy F , ends in the position (A, t,+, χ). The set S is the
team of positive final assignments of the formula χ in the game G(A, U, V, ϕ),
when A plays according to F . Similarly, let T be the set of assignments t
such that some play, where A plays according to F , ends in the position
(A, t,−, χ). The set T is the team of negative final assignments of the
formula χ in the game G(A, U, V, ϕ), when A plays according to F .
A survival strategy of A in a game G(A, U, V, ϕ) is a strategy that guar-
antees, in every play of the game where A follows F , a survival for A. Let
F be a survival strategy for A in G(A, U, V, ϕ). Let S(χ) and T (χ) denote,
respectively, the teams of positive and negative final assignments of the gen-
eralized atom χ in the game G(A, U, V, ϕ), when A plays according to F .
The survival strategy F is a uniform survival strategy for A, if for every
generalized atom χ in ϕ, we have A,
(
S(χ), T (χ)
)
|= χ.
Recall that all occurrences of a subformula in a formula ϕ are considered
to be distinct subformulae of ϕ. Therefore, for example, if ϕ is a generalized
atom and a game G(A, U, V, ϕ ∨ ϕ) is played according to some strategy,
the teams of final assignments for the different instances of ϕ may turn out
different.
When A is known from the context, we may write G(U, V, ψ) instead of
G(A, U, V, ψ). Also, we may write (s,#, ψ) instead of (A, s,#, ψ).
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Theorem 7.1. A, (U, V ) |= ϕ iff there exists a uniform survival strategy for
A in the game G(A, U, V, ϕ).
Proof. The claim is proved by induction on the structure of ϕ. The case for
atomic formulae is trivial.
Assume that (U, V ) |= ¬ψ. Therefore (V,U) |= ψ. By the induction
hypothesis, A has a uniform survival strategy F in G(V,U, ψ). The strategy
F provides a uniform survival strategy in G(U, V,¬ψ).
Assume that A has a uniform survival strategy in G(U, V,¬ψ). There-
fore A has a uniform survival strategy in G(V,U, ψ). By the induction
hypothesis, (V,U) |= ψ. Therefore (U, V ) |= ¬ψ.
Assume that (U, V ) |= ψ∨ψ′. Thus we have (U1, V ) |= ψ and (U2, V ) |=
ψ′ for some U1, U2 ⊆ U such that U1∪U2 = U . By the induction hypothesis,
the player A has a uniform survival strategy F1 in the game G(U1, V, ψ) and
F2 in the game G(U2, V, ψ
′). Define a strategy F for G(U, V, ϕ ∨ ψ) such
that
F
(
(s,+, ψ ∨ ψ′)
)
=


{ψ,ψ′} if s ∈ U1 ∩ U2
{ψ} if s ∈ U1 \ U2
{ψ′} if s ∈ U2 \ U1
for each s ∈ U . On other positions, F agrees with F1 or F2, depending on
whether the input position contains a subformula of ψ or ψ′. The strategy
F gives the same final teams of assignments as F1 and F2, and therefore F
is a uniform survival strategy for A in G(U, V, ψ ∨ ψ′).
Assume there exists a uniform survival strategy F for G(U, V, ψ ∨ ψ′).
Define U1 ⊆ U to be the set of assignments s ∈ U such that F
(
(s,+, ψ ∨
ψ′)
)
= {ψ,ψ′} or F
(
(s,+, ψ ∨ ψ′)
)
= {ψ}. Similarly, define U2 ⊆ U to
be the set of assignments s ∈ U such that F
(
(s,+, ψ ∨ ψ′)
)
= {ψ,ψ′} or
F
(
(s,+, ψ ∨ ψ′)
)
= {ψ′}. Now, F provides uniform survival strategies for
G(U1, V, ψ) and for G(U2, V, ψ
′). By the induction hypothesis, (U1, V ) |= ψ
and (U2, V ) |= ψ
′. Since U1 ∪ U2 = U , we have (U, V ) |= ψ ∨ ψ
′.
We shall not discuss the argument for ordinary generalized quantifiers,
since the related details are essentially provided by the argument for minor
quantifiers.
Assume that (U, V ) |= Mxψ. Thus there exists functions f : U → MA
and g : V →M
A
such that
(
U [x/f ] ∪ V [x/g], U [x/f ′ ] ∪ V [x/g′ ]
)
|= ψ.
By the induction hypothesis, there exists a uniform survival strategy F in
G
(
U [x/f ] ∪ V [x/g], U [x/f ′ ] ∪ V [x/g′ ], ψ
)
.
Extend the strategy F to a strategy F+ such that F+
(
(s,+,Mxψ)
)
= f(s)
for each s ∈ U and F+
(
(t,−,Mxψ)
)
= g(t) for each t ∈ V . The strategy
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F+ gives the same final teams of assignments as F , and hence F+ is a
uniform survival strategy for A in G(U, V,Mxψ).
Assume F is a uniform survival strategy in G(U, V,Mxψ). Define the
function f : U → MA such that f(s) = F
(
(s,+,Mxψ)
)
for all s ∈ U .
Define also the function g : V →M
A
such that g(s) = F
(
(s,−,Mxψ)
)
for
all s ∈ V . Now, F provides a uniform survival strategy for
G
(
U [x/f ] ∪ V [x/g], U [x/f ′ ] ∪ V [x/g ′ ], ψ
)
.
By the induction hypothesis,
(
U [x/f ] ∪ V [x/g], U [x/f ′ ] ∪ V [x/g ′ ]
)
|= ψ.
Therefore (U, V ) |=Mxψ.
8 Interpreting dependence logic with double team
semantics
In this section we discuss a simple canonical way of conservatively inter-
preting variants of dependence logic with double team semantics. We also
address some issues concerning the interpretation of dependence logic and
its variants.
Let k be a positive integer and T a non-empty set. Let R ⊆ T k be a
relation. We say that R is a partial function, if the following conditions
hold.
1. If k = 1, then |R| ≤ 1.
2. If k > 1, and if we have (s1, ..., sk−1, t) ∈ R and (s1, ..., sk−1, u) ∈ R,
then t = u.
For each positive integer k, let Dk denote the generalized quantifier that
contains the triples (A,R, S) such that the following conditions hold.
1. A is a nonempty set.
2. R ⊆ Ak and S ⊆ Ak.
3. R is a partial function and S = ∅.
Let ∆ be the class { Dk | k ∈ Z+ }.
We next define a translation of formulae of dependence logic D into a
logic with the minor quantifier ∃s and generalized atoms
Dk(x1, ..., xk;x1, ..., xk)
for each k ∈ Z+; the semantics of the atom Dk(x1, ..., xk;x1, ..., xk) is given
by the generalized quantifier Dk ∈ ∆. Define the following translation func-
tion T :
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1. If ϕ is a first-order atom, then T (ϕ) = ϕ and T (¬ϕ) = ¬ϕ.
2. T
(
=(x1, ..., xk)
)
= Dk(x1, ..., xk;x1, ..., xk) and T
(
¬ =(x1, ..., xk)
)
=
¬Dk(x1, ..., xk ;x1, ..., xk).
3. T (ϕ ∨ ψ) =
(
T (ϕ) ∨ T (ψ)
)
.
4. T (ϕ ∧ ψ) = ¬
(
¬T (ϕ) ∨ ¬T (ψ)
)
.
5. T (∃z ϕ) = ∃sz ϕ.
6. T (∀z ϕ) = ¬∃sz ¬T (ϕ).
The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 8.1. Let ϕ be a formula of dependence logic. Then A |=U ϕ
iff A, (U, ∅) |= T (ϕ).
Obviously inclusion logic with strict semantics can be similarly trans-
lated into a logic with double team semantics. A different class of general-
ized quantifiers is needed in order to define the atoms that inclusion atoms
translate to, and the alternative disjunction ∨s defined in Section 4 is used
in the target language. Also inclusion logic with lax semantics can be anal-
ogously translated. Standard disjunctions are used in the target language,
and existential quantifiers translate to the lax quantifier ∃l.
8.1 Interpreting different existential quantifiers
It is interesting to note that neither the strict nor the lax existential quanti-
fier is the same as the minor quantifier M∃ defined by the existential quan-
tifier. It is natural to consider the three different existential quantifiers as
epistemic variants of each other. Let us briefly discuss what this perspective
means.
Consider the game-theoretic semantics for minor quantifiers. Let ϕ(x)
be a first-order formula. To show that the formula ∃sxϕ(x) is true, the
agent A simply has to find a single witness b such that the formula ϕ(b)
holds. It is enough that the agent knows one suitable witness b for ϕ(x).
Let ∃t denote the minor quantifier M∃, and call it the total existential
quantifier. Establishing that ∃txϕ(x) holds is rather different from showing
that ∃sxϕ(x) holds. This time it is not enough for the agent to know a single
witness for ϕ(x). Instead, the agent has to be able to say, for each element b
in the domain of the model under investigation, whether ϕ(b) holds or not.
Therefore the agent has to have an epistemically complete understanding of
which elements of the domain satisfy ϕ(x) and which do not.
Indeed, the strict existential quantifier seems to resemble the intuitive
understanding of ordinary existence claims better than the total existential
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quantifier. But of course ∃t may be more appropriate than the ∃s in some
non-standard context.
Establishing that ∃lxϕ(x) is similar to showing that ∃sxϕ(x), but here
the agent can provide more than one witness to be taken into account in the
rest of the semantic game.
In the light of Propositions 6.1 and 4.1, the three existential quanti-
fiers are interchangeable in the context of ordinary first-order logic. But
it is possible to conceive natural non-classical logics—possibly dealing with
epistemic considerations, and not necessarily involving generalized atoms—
where different epistemic modes of existential quantification make a crucial
difference. And obviously it is rather trivial to invent ad hoc atoms A(x;x)
such that, say, ∃sxA(x;x) and ∃txA(x;x) are not equivalent.
Let T denote the trivial generalized quantifier of the type (1) defined
such that A |=FO Txϕ always holds. In the double team framework, the
statement A, ({∅}, ∅) |= TxP (x) means that the player A can classify all
elements b ∈ Dom(A) according to whether P (b) holds or not, i.e., A
can point out exactly the set of values b such that P (b). The statement
A, ({∅}, ∅) |= ∃t xP (x) means that the player A can classify all elements b
of the domain of A according to whether P (b) holds or not, and the set of
values such that P (b) holds, is nonempty. These are constructive statements
that clearly differ from the ordinary reading of the generalized quantifiers T
and ∃.
The notion of a minor quantifier provides a novel way of generalizing
the notion of a generalized quantifier by providing a fine-grained picture of
constructive issues related to verification of quantified formulae. A possible
future research direction could include considering semantic games, where
choosing (sets of) witnesses would be associated with a cost, and of course
the player(s) involved would have limited amounts of resources with which
to meet the costs. For example, in a very simple case, each element of the
domain of a model could be associated with a unit cost. Such games could
help in the analysis of proving or verifying theorems with limited resources.
A tentative approach to first-order logic with a resource consicious semantics
is given in [20].
For the sake of entertainment, let us consider the following (naive)
thought experiment. Flip a coin once in a half a minute period. Flip the
coin again in the next fifteen seconds. In the next 7.5 seconds, flip the coin
again the third time. Keep doing this, always halving the duration of the
previous period. Do this so that for at least the last third of each period, the
coin is in rest, so that no angular momentum is preserved from one period
to another. Keep doing this for one minute, and after that, do nothing for
at least three minutes. Under sufficiently naive and idealized classical as-
sumptions, this experiment can be carried out. It is then a rather puzzling
question what the state of the coin is when two minutes has passed. Is it
heads or tails? Is it something else? A truly annoying state!
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Of course we do not care about Planck’s time and all that here. This
is an entirely classical paradox. There are of course several ways of adding
constraints that make the experiment impossible. For example, we can
stipulate that each flipping of the coin consumes at least some unit amount
r of resources, and the amount of available resources is not infinite.
8.2 Observations concerning atoms
Above we translated dependence atoms =(x1, ..., xk) into atomic expressions
Dk(x1, ..., xk;x1, ..., xk). This creates an unnecessary syntactic complication:
it seems rather pointless to write x1, ..., xk twice. We can of course avoid
such complications in similar translations by simply allowing for syntactic
atomic expressions A(x1, ..., xk), whose semantics is defined by a generalized
quantifier of the type (k, k), and more generally, atoms B(x1, ..., xk) defined
by quantifiers of the type (i1, ..., ik, i1, ..., ik). Atomic expressions with the
simple syntactic form B(x1, ..., xn), where the symbol ; does not appear,
may perhaps be more appropriate for example from the point of view of
issues in natural language analysis.
Let (Q,P ) be a pair of generalized quantifiers of type (i1, ..., ik). Con-
sider atomic expressions of the type B(x1, ..., xk), where each tuple xj is
of the length ij . Extend the double team semantics such that A, (U, V ) |=
B(x1, ..., xk) iff
(
Rel(A, U, x1), ...,Rel(A, U, xk)
)
∈ QA
and (
Rel(A, V, x1), ...,Rel(A, V, xk)
)
∈ P A.
If P = Q, we call the atom defined by (Q,P ) a symmetric atom.
It is interesting to note that above it would not have been possible to
translate atoms =(x1, ..., xk) to symmetric atoms B(x1, ..., xk). The truth
definitions of the dependence atom =(x1, ..., xk) and its negated counterpart
¬ =(x1, ..., xk) are not related in a way that would lead to the required
symmetry.
Currently, there does not seem to be an account in the dependence logic
literature that thoroughly analyzes issues related to the choice of the defini-
tion A |=U ¬ =(x1, ..., xk) iff U = ∅. It is well known that dependence logic
is downwards closed, i.e., if A |=U ϕ and V ⊆ U , then A |=V ϕ. The defini-
tion A |=U ¬ =(x1, ..., xk) ⇔ A 6|=U =(x1, ..., xk) would lead to a logic that
is not downwards closed. Downwards closure is a natural intuitive property
of dependence logic. Downwards closure reflects the background intuition
that a team satisfies a formula if all assignments in it satisfy the formula.7
With the semantics A |=U ¬ =(x1, ..., xk) ⇔ U = ∅ for negated depen-
dence atoms, dependence logic is downwards closed, but still this choice of
7 We of course recall that this is nothing more than the background intuition.
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definition may seem intuitively somewhat arbitrary. At least the definition
calls for further reflection.
In inclusion logic [6], negated atoms are not allowed, and thereby no
analogous problem of interpretation arises. But the possibility of negating
atomic formulae—a syntactically natural feature—is compromised.8
We shall not attempt to analyze the issue concerning negated atoms
further, but we wish to point out that the double team framework can
perhaps help in advancing the interpretation of formalisms in the family of
dependence logic, for at least the following three reasons.
Firstly, the double team semantics provides a general framework for in-
terpreting various different variants of dependence logic. How exactly gener-
ality is related to elucidation is an interesting question itself, and obviously
we shall not attempt to analyze this issue in this article, but a general frame-
work does offer a setting for interpreting and comparing different systems
embeddable in the framework. For example, we have above given possible
interpretations for the strict and lax existential quantifiers, and also ob-
served that neither of these quantifiers is the same as the minor quantifier
defined by the ordinary existential quantifier.
Secondly, the double team semantics has obvious symmetric duality
properties concerning the interpretation of negation.9 How exactly symme-
tries lead to elucidation is an interesting question that we shall not attempt
to analyze in this article. But whatever their explanatory power may be, at
least symmetric duality properties have an obvious mathematical appeal.10
Finally, the double team semantics has a very natural game-theoretic
counterpart. A game-theoretic semantics can—at least in some reasonable
sense—be seen as fundamental in relation to other approaches, because it
provides an action based account of the meaning of formulae. On the face of
it, semantic games can seem rather far removed from contexts where natural
language is learned, but it is not difficult to invent action-based scenarios
described by semantic games, where the meaning of the words all and exists
becomes at least elucidated to an agent.
Tarski’s semantics for first-order logic essentially gives simply a transla-
tion of symbols into their natural language counterparts.11 This resembles
8Of course it should be kept in mind here that negation in the context of team semantics
is not the contradictory negation on the level of teams.
9Issues related to different modes of negation seem to lead to notable issues concern-
ing the intuitive interpretation of formulae in various systems based on team semantics.
Related issues are likely to arise also in the framework presented in the current article.
A rather obvious framework for the analysis of different negations would involve systems
based on sets of teams, or possibly pairs of sets of teams, or something similar. Such
a framework would allow for a more direct access to different uses of the contradictory
negation on different levels of type theory.
10Symmetries, as well as presentations in a more general well understood framework,
seem to play an important role in explanations in the mathematical and analytic realms.
Of course also for example analogies play a role.
11Of course Tarski’s semantics also ties truth of first-order formulae to the notion of
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translating a language into another. An interpreter has to be familiar with
the target language in order to understand the truth definition. The sit-
uation seems different in the context of action-based truth definitions.12
In fact, it seems to even make reasonable sense to consider action-based
approaches in attempts to define semantics for natural languages.13 Action-
based language acquisition is discussed for example in [26]. Wittgenstein’s
language games, described in [29], are a classical example of related consid-
erations.
Of course the claim about fundamentality of action-based approaches to
semantics is highly debatable, and obviously we do not wish to engage in
that debate here. We simply wish to point out that the game-theoretic coun-
terpart of double team semantics does provide a description of an action-
based approach to the meaning of generalized quantifiers and atoms. In
this context it is worth noting that the game-theoretic semantics is also a
novel canonical semantics for ordinary extensions of first-order logic with
generalized quantifiers—extensions that do not involve generalized atoms.
9 Complexity of DC2
9.1 The logic DC2
In this section we define the logic DC2. This logic extends both ordinary two
variable dependence logic D2 and two-variable logic with counting FOC2, as
we shall see.
Let k be a positive integer. Define the classes
E := { (A,B, ∅) | A is a non-empty set and B ⊆ A satisfies |B| ≥ k }
and
F := { (A, ∅, B) | A is a non-empty set, B ⊆ A and |A \B| < k }.
The pair (E ,F) defines the minor counting quantifier ∃≥k . Notice that ∃≥k
is a minor of the generalized quantifier { (A,B) | A 6= ∅, |B| ≥ k }.
a model, and additionally provides an inductive method for computing truth values of
formulae based on the truth values of the atoms.
12Of course game-theoretic truth definitions are still usually described in natural lan-
guage.
13 A person’s first language is learned via action-based situations. But it seems appealing
to think that logical understanding is also, up to some extent, hard-wired in the brain
or physically somehow forced. For example it is easy to conceive a person learning the
meaning of the word all in situations involving rather small collections of objects. It
is interesting that the person still learns the correct meaning of the word all, instead
of associating the word with some exotic quantifier that is equivalent to ∀ in models of
size less than, say, 400, or 21000. There seems to be a natural cognitive and inductive
generalization process involved here.
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Let τ be a relational vocabulary consisting of the union of a countably
infinite set of unary relation symbols and a countably infinite set of binary
relation symbols. Fix two distinct first-order variable symbols x and y.
Define A(τ) to be the smallest set T such that the following conditions
hold.
1. If P ∈ τ and z ∈ {x, y}, then P (z) ∈ T .
2. If R ∈ τ , and z, z′ ∈ {x, y}, then R(z, z′) ∈ T .
3. If z, z′ ∈ {x, y}, then z = z′ ∈ T .
Define two-variable first-order logic with counting (FOC2) to be the smallest
set T such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. A(τ) ⊆ T .
2. If ϕ ∈ T , then ¬ϕ ∈ T .
3. If ϕ,ψ ∈ T , then (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ T .
4. If ϕ ∈ T , z ∈ {x, y}, and k is a positive integer, then ∃≥kz ϕ ∈ T .
Here ∃≥k denotes the minor quantifier
(
E ,F
)
. The syntax of FOC2 contains
only first-order atoms, and in the light of Propositions 6.1 and 4.1, it makes
no difference whether we use ordinary Tarskian semantics or double team
semantics in the interpretation of FOC2-formulae; if ϕ is a formula of FOC2,
and ϕ′ denotes the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing each symbol ∃≥k
by a symbol that denotes the corresponding ordinary generalized quantifier,
then A, s |=FO ϕ
′ iff A,
(
{s}, ∅
)
|= ϕ.
Define A+(τ) to be the smallest set T such that the following conditions
hold.
1. If ϕ ∈ A(τ), then ϕ ∈ T .
2. If z, z′ ∈ {x, y}, then =(z, z′) ∈ T and =(z) ∈ T . Here we assume that
z 6= z′, i.e., z and z′ are different variable symbols.
The set of formulae of DC2 is the smallest set T such that the following
conditions hold.
1. A+(τ) ⊆ T .
2. If ϕ ∈ T , then ¬ϕ ∈ T .
3. If ϕ,ψ ∈ T , then (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ T .
4. If ϕ ∈ T and z ∈ {x, y}, then ∃sz ϕ ∈ T .
5. If ϕ ∈ T , z ∈ {x, y}, and k is a positive integer, then ∃≥kz ϕ ∈ T .
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Let z, z′ ∈ {x, y} be variables. The semantics of the atom =(z) in is
defined in DC2 such that A, (U, V ) |==(z) iff A, (U, V ) |= D1(z; z). Similarly,
A, (U, V ) |==(z, z′) iff A, (U, V ) |= D2
(
(z, z′); (z, z′)
)
.
The following lemma is trivial.
Lemma 9.1. Let (U, V ) and (S, T ) be a double teams such that S ⊆ U and
T ⊆ V . Let ϕ ∈ A+(τ) be any atomic formula of DC2. If (U, V ) |= ϕ, then
(S, T ) |= ϕ.
Obviously FOC2 is contained in DC2, but also D2 is essentially contained
in DC2 via the translation T defined in Section 8 (see Proposition 8.1).
We have somewhat blindly copied the atoms of D into DC2; it is an
interesting question what these atoms exactly mean in DC2, and what other
kinds of atoms and quantifiers should be considered. We leave such questions
for the future. Our objective in the rest of the current article is simply to
show how the double team semantics nicely facilitates the NEXPTIME-
completeness proof of the logic DC2, and other sufficiently similar logics.
9.2 DC2 is NEXPTIME-complete
An input to the satisfiability or finite satisfiabilily problem of DC2 is any
sentence ϕ of DC2. Note that the set of non-logical symbols of ϕ is limited
to unary and binary relation symbols only. The satisfiability problem asks
whether there exists a model A such that A,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ϕ, while the finite
satisfiability problem asks whether there exists a finite model B such that
B,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ϕ.
An input to the satisfiability or finite satisfiabilily problem of FOC2 is
any sentence ϕ of FOC2; the set of non-logical symbols of ϕ is limited to
unary and binary relation symbols only. The satisfiability problem asks
whether there exists a model A such that A |=FO ϕ, while the finite satisfi-
ability asks whether there exists a finite model B such that B |=FO ϕ.
Below we show that the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of
DC2 are NEXPTIME-complete. Our proof uses the fact that the satisfia-
bility and finite satisfiability problems of FOC2 are NEXPTIME-complete
(see [25]). We translate DC2 formulae into equisatisfiable formulae of FOC2
with a polynomial cost in the formula length; the translation can be carried
out in logarithmic space. A formula ϕ translates to a formula
ϕ∗ := ψinitial ∧
∧
χ ∈ SUBϕ
ψχ.
Each conjunct ψχ contains two fresh relation symbols Sχ and Tχ. Intuitively,
the pair (Sχ, Tχ) encodes the double team (Uχ, Vχ) that satisfies χ, when
ϕ is evaluated in a model where ϕ holds. If χ is not an atom, the formula
ψχ also contains auxiliary formulae that describe how double teams evolve,
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when ϕ is evaluated. For example, if χ = ∃sxα, then ψχ describes how the
double team (Uχ, Vχ) gives rise to a double team (Uα, Vα) that satisfies α.
In addition to relation symbols Sχ, Tχ corresponding to double teams,
further fresh variable symbols are used in ψχ when χ is a formula whose
main connective is a quantifier. The fresh symbols EUfα , E
Vg ′
α correspond
to the teams U [z/f ], V [z/g′] needed in the truth definition of quantified
formulae.14
The logic FOC2 uses only two variables, and this creates some obstacles
that need to be overcome when writing the formulae ψχ. Due to the ex-
pressivity limitations of FOC2, we need to control the evaluation of double
teams (Uχ, Vχ). For example, if χ = ∃
sxα and the domain of Uχ contains
x, then we need to ensure that the new values of x in U [x/f ] are in a sense
independent of the old values of x in U ; the related definitions are formally
discussed below. Lemma 9.2 ensures that we can indeed control the evalua-
tion of the teams (Uχ, Vχ) in the desired way, and therefore the two-variable
logic FOC2 is sufficiently expressive for our purposes.
While formulae ψχ describe double teams corresponding to subformulae
of ϕ, the formula ψinitial simply sets the stage by asserting that the team
satisfying ϕ itself corresponds to the team
(
{∅}, ∅
)
.
We are now ready for the formal details of the proof that the logic DC2
is complete for NEXPTIME. We begin by some auxiliary definitions and
the auxiliary Lemmata 9.2 and 9.3. We then formally define the conjuncts
of ϕ∗ and show that ϕ and ϕ∗ are equisatisfiable.
Let U be a team for a model A. Let A be the domain of A. Assume the
domain of U contains the variable x. Let s, t ∈ U be assignments such that
s(z) = t(z) for all z ∈ Dom(U) \ {x}. Then t is called an x-variant of s (in
U). Note that s is an x-variant of itself.
Let M be a minor quantifier, and let N ∈ {MA,M
A
}. Let f : U → N
be a function. Assume that we have we have f(s) = f(t) for all valuations
s, t ∈ U such that t is an x-variant of s. Then we say that f is x-independent.
Let g : U → N be a function. Assume g0 : U → N is an x-independent
function such that for each s ∈ U , there exists an x-variant t ∈ U of s such
that g0(s) = g(t). Then g0 is an x-independent minor of g.
Let U be a team with the domain {x, y} and for a model A, where x
and y are the variables used in DC2 and FOC2. We let Rel(U) denote the
relation Rel
(
U,A, (x, y)
)
, as opposed to Rel
(
U,A, (y, x)
)
. This means that
we in a sense nominate x as the first variable and y as the second one. This
convention will simplify the notation below. If U is a team with the domain
{z}, where z ∈ {x, y}, then we let Rel(U) denote Rel
(
U,A, z
)
.
14It turns out that there is no need for symbols EUf
′
α , E
Vg . In fact, even the symbols EUfα
and EVg
′
α could be eliminated, but we keep them for the sake of presentation. The reader
may consider further minor quantifiers for which the proofs in this section go trough. In
doing so, using extra predicates EUfα , E
Vg′
α , E
Uf ′
α , E
Vg may help.
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Lemma 9.2. Let ψ be a formula of DC2. Let M ∈ {∃s ,∃≥k}, where k
is a positive integer. Let z ∈ {x, y} be a variable. Let f : U → MA and
g : V → M
A
be functions, and let f0 and g0 be z-independent minors of f
and g, respectively. If
A,
(
U [z/f ] ∪ V [z/g], U [z/f ′ ] ∪ V [ z/g ′ ]
)
|= ψ,
then
A,
(
U [z/f0] ∪ V [z/g0], U [z/f0
′ ] ∪ V [ z/g0
′ ]
)
|= ψ.
Proof. Assume that
(
U [z/f ] ∪ V [z/g], U [z/f ′ ] ∪ V [ z/g ′ ]
)
|= ψ. (1)
It is clear that U [z/f0] ⊆ U [z/f ] and V [z/g0
′ ] ⊆ V [ z/g ′ ]. It is also clear
that V [z/g0 ] = V [ z/g ] = U [x/f0
′ ] = U [x/f ′ ] = ∅. Therefore
U [z/f0] ∪ V [z/g0] ⊆ U [z/f ] ∪ V [z/g] (2)
and
U [z/f0
′ ] ∪ V [ z/g0
′ ] ⊆ U [z/f ′ ] ∪ V [ z/g ′ ]. (3)
We define a strategy for the player A in the game
G∗ := G
(
A, U [z/f0] ∪ V [z/g0], U [z/f0
′ ] ∪ V [ z/g0
′ ], ψ
)
.
Due to Equation 1, player A has a uniform survival strategy F in the game
G := G
(
A, U [z/f ] ∪ V [z/g], U [z/f ′ ] ∪ V [ z/g ′ ], ψ
)
.
Due to Equations 2 and 3, the strategy F can be canonically restricted to a
strategy H for the game G∗. We need to show that H is a uniform survival
strategy for A in G∗.
Since H is a restriction of the uniform survival strategy F , the player A
survives each play of the game G∗ played according to H. To see that H
is a uniform survival strategy, consider the sets S∗(χ) and T ∗(χ) of positive
and negative final assignments for an atomic subformula χ of ψ, when A
follows H in G∗. Let S(χ) and T (χ) be the corresponding sets in the game
G, when A follows F .
It is clear that S∗(χ) ⊆ S(χ) and T ∗(χ) ⊆ T (χ). Due to Equation 1, we
have
(
S(χ), T (χ)
)
|= χ. By Lemma 9.1, we have
(
S∗(χ), T ∗(χ)
)
|= χ, and
therefore H is a uniform survival strategy for A in the game G∗.
It turns out that we do not actually need Lemma 9.2 in full generality.
The essential part of the Lemma is that functions f : U → ∃s A can be
assumed to be z-independent; see the proof of Lemma 9.4 for further details.
Let ψ be a sentence of DC2. Define Domψ(ψ) = ∅. Assume then that
we have defined Domψ(χ) for χ ∈ SUBψ.
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1. If χ = ∃≥kxα or χ = ∃sxα, define Domψ(α) = Domψ(χ) ∪ {x}.
2. If χ = ∃≥ky α or χ = ∃sy α, define Domψ(α) = Domψ(χ) ∪ {y}.
3. If χ = χ1 ∨ χ2, define Domψ(χ1) = Domψ(χ2) = Domψ(χ).
4. If χ = ¬α, define Domψ(α) = Domψ(χ).
Lemma 9.3. Let ψ be a sentence of DC2 and U a team with exactly one
assignment. Then A,
(
U, ∅
)
|= ψ iff A,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ψ.
Proof. Let s be the unique assignment in U . Assume that A, (U, ∅) |= ψ.
The player A has a uniform survival strategy F in the game G
(
{s}, ∅, ψ
)
.
(Recall that we may write G
(
U, ∅, ψ
)
instead of G
(
A, U, ∅, ψ
)
.)
Now, let F ′ be the strategy for G({∅}, ∅, ψ), where A canonically copies
the moves determined by F in G({s}, ∅, ψ). This means that for each po-
sition (A, t,#, α) in G({∅}, ∅, ψ), we define F ′(A, t,#, α) := F (A, t′,#, α),
where t = t′ ↾ Domψ(α), i.e., t is the restriction of t
′ to the set Domψ(α).
It is easy to show that F ′ is well-defined. Let χ be an arbitrary atom of ψ,
and let S(χ) and T (χ) be the sets of positive and negative final assignments
for χ in the game G
(
{s}, ∅, ψ
)
, when A follows the strategy F . Recalling
that ψ is a sentence, it is easy to see that the teams of positive and negative
final assignments S∗(χ) and T ∗(χ) that arise in G({∅}, ∅, ψ) when A follows
F ′, are exactly the same teams as those that arise in G({s}, ∅, ψ) when A
follows F , i.e., S∗(χ) = S(χ) and T ∗(χ) = T (χ). Thus A, ({∅}, ∅ ) |= ψ.
The converse implication is similar. Assume that A, ({∅}, ∅) |= ψ. Thus
A has a uniform survival strategy H in the game G({∅}, ∅, ψ). let H ′ be
the strategy for G({ s}, ∅, ψ), where A canonically copies the moves deter-
mined by H in G({∅}, ∅, ψ). This means that for each position (A, t,#, α)
in G({ s}, ∅, ψ), we define H ′(A, t,#, α) := H(A, t′,#, α), where t′ = t ↾
Domψ(α). Let χ be an arbitrary atom of ψ, and let S(χ) and T (χ) be the
sets of positive and negative final assignments for χ in the game G
(
{∅}, ∅, ψ
)
,
when A follows the strategy H. It is easy to see that the teams of positive
and negative final assignments S∗(χ) and T ∗(χ) that arise in G({s}, ∅, ψ)
when A follows H ′, are exactly the same teams as those that arise in
G({∅}, ∅, ψ) when A follows H, i.e., S∗(χ) = S(χ) and T ∗(χ) = T (χ).
Thus A, ({s}, ∅ ) |= ψ.
Now fix a sentence ϕ of DC2. Our next aim is to define the FOC2
sentence ϕ∗ and then prove that ϕ and ϕ∗ are equisatisfiable.
Let ψ be an arbitrary subformula of ϕ. Having fixed the sentence ϕ, we
shall write Dom(ψ) instead of Domϕ(ψ) in the rest of the article.
Let σ be the set of relation symbols that occur in ϕ. As discussed above,
ϕ∗ contains extra relation symbols that encode information concerning sub-
formulae of ϕ. Let QSUBϕ denote the set of formulae α ∈ SUBϕ such that
there exists another subformula ψ = Qz α ∈ SUBϕ, where Q ∈ {∃
≥k,∃s}.
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For each formula α ∈ QSUBϕ, define the fresh relation symbols E
Uf
α and
EVg
′
α . The arity of each of these symbols is |Dom(α)|, i.e., the number of
variables in Dom(α).
Additionally, for each formula χ ∈ SUBϕ, define fresh relation symbols
Sχ and Tχ. The arity of the symbols Sχ and Tχ is equal to |Dom(χ)|. The
set of relation symbols in ϕ∗ is the set
σ ∪ {EUfα | α ∈ QSUBϕ } ∪ {E
Vg ′
α | α ∈ QSUBϕ }
∪ {Sχ | χ ∈ SUBϕ } ∪ {Tχ | χ ∈ SUBϕ }.
Let σ∗ denote this set.
Define ψinitial := ∃
=1xSϕ(x) ∧ ¬∃xTχ(x). Here ∃
=1x is the FOC2-
expressible quantfier that states that there exists exactly one x satisfying
the quantified formula. To fully define ϕ∗, we still need to define the formulae
ψχ for each formula χ ∈ SUBϕ.
Let χ ∈ SUBϕ. If χ = χ1 ∨ χ2 and Dom(χ) = {x, y}, then ψχ is the
conjunction of the formulae
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) ↔
(
Sχ1(x, y) ∨ Sχ2(x, y)
))
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) ↔ Tχ1(x, y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) ↔ Tχ2(x, y)
)
.
If χ = ∃≥ky α and Dom(χ) = {x, y}, then ψχ is the conjunction of the
formulae
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) → ∃
≥ky EUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → ∃y Sχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) → ¬∃
≥ky ¬EVg
′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → ∃y Tχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
If χ is the atomic formula =(x, y), and thus necessarily Dom(χ) = {x, y},
then ψχ is the conjunction of the formulae
ψ1χ := ¬∃x∃
≥2y Sχ(x, y),
ψ2χ := ¬∃x∃y Tχ(x, y).
The structure of each formula ψχ, where χ ∈ SUBϕ, depends on χ and
Dom(χ). A complete list of these formulae is given in the Appendix.
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Lemma 9.4. Assume A is a σ-model such that A,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ϕ. Let A be
the domain of A. Then there exists a σ∗-model A∗ with the same domain A
such that A∗ |=FO ϕ
∗.
Proof. The relation symbols R ∈ σ are interpreted in A∗ such that RA
∗
:=
RA. The interpretations of the relation symbols in σ∗ \ σ are given below.
Let U is an team with the domain {x} and for the model A. Assume U
contains exactly one assignment. Since A, ({∅}, ∅) |= ψ, we have A, (U, ∅) |=
ϕ by Lemma 9.3. We shall next recursively define a double team (Uχ, Vχ)
for each subformula χ ∈ SUBϕ such that A, (Uχ, Vχ) |= χ holds. We shall
simultaneously define the interpretations of the symbols in σ∗ \ σ, thereby
completing the definition of the model A∗.
First define (Uϕ, Vϕ) := (U, ∅). Define S
A∗
ϕ = Rel(Uϕ). Also define
TA
∗
ϕ := ∅. Now consider a formula χ ∈ SUBϕ, and assume that we have
defined Uχ and Vχ such that A, (Uχ, Vχ) |= χ.
Assume first that χ = ∃≥kxα. As A, (Uχ, Vχ) |= ∃
≥kxα, there exist
functions f : Uχ → ∃
≥k A and g : Vχ → ∃≥k
A
such that
(
Uχ[x/f ] ∪ Vχ[x/g ], Uχ[x/f
′ ] ∪ Vχ[x/g
′ ]
)
|= α.
Furthermore, by Lemma 9.2, we assume, w.l.o.g., that the functions f and
g are x-independent. We make the following definitions.
1. Uα := Uχ[x/f ] ∪ Vχ[x/g ] = Uχ[x/f ]
2. Vα := Uχ[x/f
′ ] ∪ Vχ[x/g
′ ] = Vχ[x/g
′ ]
3. SA
∗
α := Rel
(
Uα
)
4. TA
∗
α := Rel
(
Vα
)
5. EUfα
A∗
:= Rel
(
Uχ[x/f ]
)
= SA
∗
α
6. EVg
′
α
A∗
:= Rel
(
Vχ[x/g
′]
)
= TA
∗
α
The cases where χ is a formula of any of the types ∃≥ky α, ∃sxα, ∃sy α, are
treated analogously. It is essential—as we shall see—that the function f is
x-independent in the case χ = ∃sxα, and y-independent when χ = ∃sy α.
Consider then the case where χ is α∨β. Since (Uχ, Vχ) |= α∨β, we have
(U1, Vχ) |= α and (U2, Vχ) |= β for some U1, U2 ⊆ Uχ such that U1∪U2 = Uχ.
We define (Uα, Vα) := (U1, Vχ) and (Uβ , Vβ) := (U2, Vχ). We also define
SA
∗
α := Rel(Uα), T
A∗
α := Rel(Vα), S
A∗
β := Rel(Uβ), and T
A∗
β := Rel(Vβ).
In the case where χ is ¬α, we define Uα := Vχ and Vα := Uχ. We also
define SA
∗
α := Rel(Uα) and T
A∗
α := Rel(Vα).
We have now defined the teams Uχ and Vχ for each χ ∈ SUBϕ such that
we have A, (Uχ, Vχ) |= χ. We have also fully defined a σ
∗-model A∗. We
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shall next show that A∗ |=FO ϕ
∗. While it is clear that A∗ |=FO ψinitial , we
must show that A∗ |=FO ψχ for each χ ∈ SUBϕ.
Let us first consider the case where χ is of the form ∃sy α for some
α ∈ SUBϕ. This case divides into further subcases, depending on Dom(χ).
We assume first that Dom(χ) = {x, y}. We know that there exist y-
independent functions f : Uχ → ∃
s A and g : Vχ → ∃s
A
such that
A,
(
Uχ[ y/f ] ∪ Vχ[ y/g ], Uχ[ y/f
′ ] ∪ Vχ[ y/g
′ ]
)
|= α.
We have Rel(Uχ[ y/f ]) = E
Uf
α
A∗
, Rel(Vχ[ y/g ]) = ∅, Rel(Uχ[ y/f
′ ]) = ∅
and Rel(Vχ[ y/g
′ ]) = EVg
′
α
A∗
.
We shall first show that A∗ |=FO ψ
1
χ. Here it is essential that the function
f is y-independent. Assume that A∗, [x 7→ a, y 7→ b] |=FO Sχ(x, y). Thus
(a, b) ∈ SA
∗
χ = Rel(Uχ). Since f is y-independent, there exists exactly one
element b′ ∈ A such that (a, b′) ∈ Rel(Uχ[y/f ]) = E
Uf
α
A∗
. Therefore we have
A∗, [x 7→ a] |=FO ∃
=1y EUfα (x, y), as required.
We have A∗ |=FO ψ
2
χ since for every assignment s ∈ Uχ[ y/f ] such that
s(x) = a, there must exist an assignment s′ ∈ Uχ such that s
′(x) = a. We
can similarly show that A∗ |=FO ψ
3
χ ∧ ψ
4
χ.
The fact that A∗ |=FO ψ
5
χ∧ψ
6
χ follows immediately since Uα = Uχ[y/f ] ∪
Vχ[y/g] and Vα = Uχ[ y/f
′ ] ∪ Vχ[ y/g
′ ].
The cases where Dom(χ) is {x}, {y}, or ∅, are similar, as are the cases
where χ := ∃sxα. Also all cases where χ := ∃≥ky α or ∃≥kxα are similar; we
shall discuss the details of the case where χ := ∃≥kxα and Dom(χ) = {x}.
We know that there exist functions f : Uχ → ∃
≥k A and g : Vχ → ∃≥k
A
such that
A,
(
Uχ[x/f ] ∪ Vχ[x/g ], Uχ[x/f
′ ] ∪ Vχ[x/g
′ ]
)
|= α.
We have Rel(Uχ[x/f ]) = E
Uf
α
A∗
, Rel(Vχ[x/g ]) = ∅, Rel(Uχ[x/f
′ ]) = ∅
and Rel(Vχ[x/g
′ ]) = EVg
′
α
A∗
. Let us show that A∗ |=FO ψ
1
χ. Assume
that A∗, [x 7→ a] |=FO Sχ(x) for some a ∈ A. Thus S
A∗
χ = Rel(Uχ) 6= ∅,
whence Uχ 6= ∅ . Therefore there exist at least k elements b ∈ A such that
b ∈ Rel(Uχ[x/f ]) = E
Uf
α
A∗
. Therefore A∗ |=FO ∃
≥kxEUfα (x), as required.
We have A∗ |=FO ψ
2
χ since if Uχ[x/f ] 6= ∅, then Uχ 6= ∅. To show that
A∗ |=FO ψ
3
χ, assume that A
∗, [x 7→ a] |=FO Tχ(x) for some a ∈ A. Thus
TA
∗
χ = Rel(Vχ) is not empty. Let s ∈ Vχ. Recall that g2 denotes the second
coordinate function of g. By the definition of the minor quantifier ∃≥k, there
are at most k− 1 elements in the set A \ g2(s). Thus there are at most k− 1
elements in A\Rel
(
Vχ[x/g
′ ]
)
. Therefore we have A∗ |=FO ¬∃
≥kx¬EVg
′
α (x),
and hence A∗ |=FO ψ
3
χ.
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We have A∗ |=FO ψ4 since if Vχ[x/g
′ ] is not empty, then Vχ cannot be
empty. We have A∗ |=FO ψ5 ∧ ψ6 since Uα = Uχ[x/f ] and Vα = Vχ[x/g
′ ].
The cases where χ = χ1 ∨ χ2 and χ = ¬α are straightforward, so we
omit them and move directly to the cases where χ is an atomic formula.
Assume first that χ = R(y, x) for some relation symbol R. We must show
that A∗ |=FO ∀x∀y
(
SR(y,x)(x, y) → R(y, x)
)
. (Notice indeed the order of all
tuples of variables.) Assume that A∗, [x 7→ a, y 7→ b] |=FO SR(y,x)(x, y). By
the definition of the relation SA
∗
R(y,x), this means that (a, b) ∈ Rel(UR(y,x)).
We have A, (UR(y,x), VR(y,x)) |=FO R(y, x), and therefore A
∗, s |=FO R(y, x)
for all s ∈ UR(y,x). Thus A
∗, [x 7→ a, y 7→ b] |=FO R(y, x). All the remaining
arguments for the cases where χ is an atomic first-order formula, are similar.
Assume then that χ is the atom =(x, y). We must establish that we
have A∗ |=FO ¬∃x∃
≥2y S=(x,y)(x, y). Assume A
∗, [x 7→ a, y 7→ b] |=FO
S=(x,y)(x, y) for some a, b ∈ A. Therefore (a, b) ∈ Rel(U=(x,y)). We have
A,
(
U=(x,y), V=(x,y)
)
|= = (x, y), and therefore s(y) = s′(y) for all s, s′ ∈
U=(x,y) such that s(x) = s
′(x). Hence there is no pair (a, b′) ∈ Rel(U=(x,y)) =
SA
∗
=(x,y) such that b 6= b
′. Thus A∗ |=FO ¬∃x∃
≥2y S=(x,y)(x, y), as required.
All remaining arguments concerning non-first-order atoms are similar.
Lemma 9.5. Let B∗ be a σ∗-model such that B∗ |=FO ϕ
∗. Let B be the
domain of B∗. Then there exists a σ-model B with the same domain B
such that B,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ϕ.
Proof. Assume that B∗ |=FO ϕ
∗. Let B be the reduct of B∗ to the vo-
cabulary σ, i.e., the domain of B is B, and each relation symbol R ∈ σ is
interpreted such that RB := RB
∗
.
We shall next define a double team (Uχ, Vχ) for each χ ∈ SUBϕ. We
shall then establish that B,
(
Uχ, Vχ
)
|= χ for each χ ∈ SUBϕ.
If Dom(χ) is any of the sets {x}, {y}, {x, y}, we let Uχ and Vχ be the
teams with the domain Dom(χ) and codomain B such that Rel(Uχ) = S
B∗
χ
and Rel(Vχ) = T
B∗
χ . If Dom(χ) is ∅, we let Uχ and Vχ be the teams with the
domain {x} and codomain B such that Rel(Uχ) = S
B∗
χ and Rel(Vχ) = T
B∗
χ .
We shall prove by induction on the structure of ϕ that B,
(
Uχ, Vχ
)
|= χ
for each χ ∈ SUBϕ. We shall then establish that B,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ϕ.
Assume first that χ is the atomic formula R(y, x). Let s ∈ UR(y,x)
be an assignment. Thus B∗, s |=FO SR(y,x)(x, y). Since B
∗ |=FO ψR(y,x),
we have B∗, s |=FO R(y, x). We show similarly that if t ∈ VR(y,x), then
B∗, t 6|= R(y, x). Therefore B,
(
UR(y,x), VR(y,x)
)
|= R(y, x). The correspond-
ing argument for other first-order atoms is similar.
Let χ be the atom = (x, y). Since B∗ |=FO ψχ, there exist no pairs
(a, b), (a, b′) ∈ SB
∗
χ such that b 6= b
′. Furthermore, TB
∗
α = ∅. Therefore
B, (Uχ, Vχ) |= χ. The corresponding arguments for other non-first-order
atoms of DC2 are similar.
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For the sake of induction, let χ := ∃≥ky α be a subformula of ϕ, and
assume that B, (Uα, Vα) |= α. We need to show that B, (Uχ, Vχ) |= χ.
Let us consider the case where Dom(χ) = {x, y}. We define a function
f : Uχ → ∃
≥kB as follows. Assume s ∈ Uχ is an assignment such that
s(x) = a and s(y) = b for some a, b ∈ B. Thus (a, b) ∈ SB
∗
χ . Since
B∗ |=FO ψ
1
χ, the set
Bs := { c ∈ A | B
∗, [x 7→ a, y 7→ c ] |= EUfα (x, y) } (4)
has at least k elements. Define f : Uχ → ∃
≥kB such that f(s) := (Bs, ∅) for
each s ∈ Uχ. Thus Rel(Uχ[ y/f ]) ⊆ E
Uf
α
B∗
.
Let us then similarly define a function g : Vχ → ∃≥k
B
. Let s ∈ Vχ be
an assignment such that s(x) = a and s(y) = b for some a, b ∈ B. Thus
(a, b) ∈ TB
∗
χ . Since B
∗ |=FO ψ
3
χ, the number of elements in the set
Cs := { c ∈ A | B
∗, [x 7→ a, y 7→ c ] |= EVg
′
χ (x, y) } (5)
satisfies the condition |B \ Cs| < k. Define g : Vχ → ∃≥k
B
such that
g(s) := (∅, Cs) for each s ∈ Vχ. Thus Rel(Vχ[ y/g
′ ]) ⊆ EVg
′
α
B∗
.
As U [ y/f ′ ] = V [ y/g ] = ∅, we now know that
Rel
(
Uχ[ y/f ] ) ∪ Rel(Vχ[ y/g ]
)
⊆ EUfα
B∗
(6)
and
Rel
(
Uχ[ y/f
′ ] ) ∪ Rel(Vχ[ y/g
′ ]
)
⊆ EVg
′
α
B∗
. (7)
We then show that also the converse inclusion of Equation 6 holds. As-
sume that (a, c) ∈ EUfα
B∗
. As B∗ |=FO ψ
2
χ, there exists some b ∈ B such
that (a, b) ∈ Rel(Uχ). Let s ∈ Uχ be the assignment such that s(x) = a
and s(y) = b. Now, by the definition of f (see Equation 4), we observe
that since (a, c) ∈ EUfα
B∗
, we have c ∈ f1(s); recall here that f1 denotes the
first coordinate function of f . Thus (a, c) ∈ Rel(Uχ[ y/f ]). Therefore the
converse inclusion of Equation 6 holds.
We then establish that also the converse inclusion of Equation 7 holds.
Assume that (a, c) ∈ EVg
′
α
B∗
. As B∗ |=FO ψ
4
χ, there exists some b ∈ B such
that (a, b) ∈ Rel(Vχ). Let s ∈ Vχ be the assignment such that s(x) = a
and s(y) = b. By the definition of the function g (Equation 5), we observe
that c ∈ g2(s). Thus (a, c) ∈ Rel(Vχ[ y/g
′ ]). Hence the converse inclusion
of Equation 7 holds.
As B∗ |=FO ψ
5
χ ∧ ψ
6
χ, we conclude that Uχ[ y/f ] ∪ Vχ[ y/g ] = Uα and
Vχ[ y/f
′ ]∪ Vχ[ y/g
′ ] = Vα. As B, (Uα, Vα) |= α, we therefore conclude that
B, (Uχ, Vχ) |= χ.
The remaining cases where χ = ∃≥ky α or χ = ∃≥kxα, are similar. We
next deal with the strict existential quantifier ∃s.
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Let χ := ∃sxα, and assumeB, (Uα, Vα) |= α. Let us consider the details
of case where Dom(χ) = {y}. We define a function f : Uχ → ∃
sB as follows.
Assume s ∈ Uχ is an assignment such that s(y) = a for some a ∈ B. Thus
a ∈ SB
∗
χ . Since B
∗ |=FO ψ
1
χ, the size of the set
Bs := { c ∈ A | B
∗, [x 7→ c, y 7→ a ] |= EUfα (x, y) } (8)
is exactly one. Define f : Uχ → ∃
sB such that f(s) := (Bs, ∅) for each s ∈
Uχ. Thus Rel (Uχ[x/f ]) ⊆ E
Uf
α
B∗
. We also of course have Rel(Uχ[x/f
′ ]) =
∅.
Let us then define the function g : Vχ → ∃s
B
such that g(s) = (∅, B)
for each s ∈ Vχ. Assume s ∈ Vχ is an assignment such that s(y) = a. Thus
a ∈ TB
∗
χ . Since B
∗ |=FO ψ
3
χ, we have (c, a) ∈ E
Vg ′
α
B∗
for each c ∈ A. Thus
Rel(Vχ[x/g
′ ]) ⊆ EVg
′
α
B∗
.
As Rel(Vχ[x/g ]) and Rel(Vχ[x/f
′ ]) are empty, we have
Rel
(
Uχ[x/f ] ) ∪ Rel(Vχ[x/g ]
)
⊆ EUfα
B∗
(9)
and
Rel
(
Uχ[x/f
′ ] ) ∪ Rel(Vχ[x/g
′ ]
)
⊆ EVg
′
α
B∗
. (10)
We then show that the converse inclusion of Equation 9 holds. Assume
that (a, b) ∈ EUfα
B∗
. As B∗ |=FO ψ
2
χ, we have b ∈ Rel(Uχ). Let s ∈ Uχ
be the assignment such that s(y) = b. Now, by the definition of f (see
Equation 8), since (a, b) ∈ EUfα
B∗
, we have (a, b) ∈ Rel
(
U [x/f ]
)
. Therefore
the converse inclusion of Equation 9 holds.
It is easy to establish that also the converse inclusion of Equation 10
holds. Therefore, as B∗ |=FO ψ
5
χ∧ψ
6
χ, we infer that Uχ[ y/f ]∪Vχ[ y/g ] = Uα
and Vχ[ y/f
′ ] ∪ Vχ[ y/g
′ ] = Vα. As B, (Uα, Vα) |= α, we therefore conclude
that B, (Uχ, Vχ) |= χ.
We have now discussed the cases where χ = ∃≥kz α or χ = ∃sz α; here
z ∈ {x, y}. The arguments for the cases where χ = α ∨ β or χ = ¬α, are
straightforward.
We conclude that B, (Uϕ, Vϕ) |= ϕ. Since B
∗ |=FO ψinitial , we have
Rel(Uϕ) = S
B∗
ϕ = {b} for some b ∈ B and Rel(Vϕ) = T
B∗
ϕ = ∅. Hence
B,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ϕ by Lemma 9.3.
Theorem 9.6. The satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of DC2
are complete for NEXPTIME.
Proof. The satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of DC2 are in
NEXPTIME due to the translation from DC2 into FOC2 defined above;
it is shown in [25] that the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems for
FOC2 are NEXPTIME-complete. Furthermore, the satisfiability and finite
satisfiability problems for DC2 are NEXPTIME-hard, since DC2 contains
FOC2.
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10 A semantics for single teams
In this section we define a semantics for variants of dependence logic with
generalized quantifiers based on single teams. We also simplify the notion of
a generalized atom in a trivial way so that it works naturally in this context.
Let us first define the following semantics with two semantic turnstiles |=+
and |=− instead of one.
A, U |=+ y1 = y2 ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO y1 = y2
)
.
A, U |=− y1 = y2 ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO y1 6= y2
)
.
A, U |=+ R(y1, ..., ym) ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s |=FO R(y1, ..., ym)
)
.
A, U |=− R(y1, ..., ym) ⇔ ∀s ∈ U
(
A, s 6|=FO R(y1, ..., ym)
)
.
A, U |=+ ¬ϕ ⇔ A, U |=− ϕ.
A, U |=− ¬ϕ ⇔ A, U |=+ ϕ.
A, U |=+ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ A, U1 |=
+ ϕ and A, U2 |=
+ ψ for
some U1, U2 ⊆ U such that U1 ∪ U2 = U.
A, U |=− (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ A, U |=− ϕ and A, U |=− ψ.
For a generalized quantifier Q of the type (i1, ..., in), we define
A, U |=+ Qx1, ..., xn(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)
if and only if there exists a function f : U → QA such that
A, U [x1/f1] |=
+ ϕ and U [x1/f1
′ ] |=− ϕ1,
...
A, U [xn/fn] |=
+ ϕ and U [xn/fn
′ ] |=− ϕn.
We also define
A, U |=− Qx1, ..., xn(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)
if and only if there exists a function g : U → Q
A
such that
A, U [x1/g1] |=
+ ϕ and U [x1/g1
′ ] |=− ϕ1,
...
A, U [xn/gn] |=
+ ϕ and U [xn/gn
′ ] |=− ϕn.
It is straightforward to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 10.1. Let ϕ be a formula of first-order logic, possibly ex-
tended with generalized quantifiers. Let U be a team. Then the equivalences
A, U |=+ ϕ ⇔ ∀s ∈ U(A, s |=FO ϕ) and A, U |=
− ϕ ⇔ ∀s ∈ U(A, s 6|=FO
ϕ) hold.
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For a minor quantifier M , we define A, U+ |= Mxϕ if and only if there
exists a function f : U →MA such that
A, U [x/f ] |=+ ϕ and A, U [x/f ′ ] |=− ϕ.
We also define A, U |=− Mxϕ if and only if there exists a function g : U →
M
A
such that
A, U [x/g] |=+ ϕ and A, U [x/g′ ] |=− ϕ.
If Q is a generalized quantifier andM ≤ Q its minor, we can replace Q byM
or vice versa, without affecting the satisfaction of formulae. Note, however,
that this interchangeability does not generally hold if we add generalized
atoms into the picture.
Indeed, we can naturally extend the single team framework with a suit-
able notion of a generalized atom. Let (Q,P ) be a pair of generalized quan-
tifiers, each of the type (i1, ..., ik). Consider syntactic atomic expressions of
the type A(y1, ..., yk), where each yj is of the length ij . We define
A, U |=+ A(y1, ..., yk) ⇔
(
Rel(U,A, y1), ...,Rel (U,A, yk)
)
∈ QA
and
A, U |=− A(y1, ..., yk) ⇔
(
Rel (U,A, y1), ...,Rel (U,A, yk)
)
∈ PA.
Of course the functions f and g need to respect the repetitions of the tuples
yi.
We do not claim that the single team semantics is somekind of a counter-
part of the double team semantics. There are interesting subtleties related
to differences between the single team semantics and the double team se-
mantics. For example, let B denote the atom of the type (1; 1) such that
A, (U, V ) |= B(x) iff both Rel(U,A, x) = A and Rel(V,A, x) = A, where
A is the domain of A. Let B∗ denote the atom for single team seman-
tics such that A, U |=+ B∗(x) iff Rel(U,A, x) = A and A, U |=− B∗(x) iff
Rel(U,A, x) = A. Let ∃t denote the minor quantifier M∃. Let B be a model
whose domain contains two elements. Now B,
(
{∅}, ∅
)
|= ∃tx∃txB(x),
while B, {∅} 6|=+ ∃tx∃txB∗(x) and B, ∅ 6|=− ∃t x∃txB∗(x).
It is not difficult to devise a corresponding symmetric game-theoretic
semantics for single teams, but we shall not do this in the current article for
the sake of brevity. The uniformity condition here seems to be—in a subtle
way—quite different from the uniformity condition of the game semantics
corresponding to the double team semantics. But as said, we shall not
attempt to provide an account of the game corresponding to the single team
semantics in this article.
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11 Reflections on general perspectives
In this section we briefly discuss the interpretation of team semantics by
considering a rather general approach to related technical issues. The inves-
tigations are based on the use of a semantics that resembles Scott-Montague
semantics, as suggested in [16]. The findings may perhaps elucidate issues
related to team semantics and double team semantics, and provide insight
into the differences of the two approaches. The investigations are also of
interest independently of team semantics.
Let τ be a vocabulary. Consider structures of the type
(A, S1, ..., Sn),
where A is a τ -structure with the domain A, and for each j ∈ {1, ..., n},
Sj ⊆ A
ij is a relation of the arity ij . Thus the relations S1, ..., Sn have the
arities i1, ..., in, respectively. Note that the relations Sj are not part of A, but
are instead extra relations. Define an operation of the type (τ, i1, ..., in+1)
to be a class function F (too large to be a set) that maps any structure
(A, S1, ..., Sn) of the appropriate type to a relation R ⊆ A
in+1 of the arity
i(n+1). The operator F satisfies the constraint that if A and B are τ -models
with the domains A and B, respectively, and if f : A → B is an isomor-
phism from (A, S1, ..., Sn) to (B, S
′
1, ..., S
′
n), then f(F ( (A, S1, ..., Sn) ) ) =
F ( (B, S′1, ..., S
′
n) ).
15 A very important class of operators is the class where
τ is the empty signature. In the elaborations below, it may help to always
first consider the special case of such operators.
Fix a possibly infinite index set I. A logic that deals with the above
operations can be based on a grammar of the type
ϕ ::= Pi | 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn),
where Pi is a relation symbol such that i ∈ I. The relation symbols Pi may
have different arities. Of course we can have more than one operator F in
the logic; for example, if G and H are operators of the types (τ, i′1, ..., i
′
m+1)
and (τ, i′′1 , ..., i
′′
k+1), respectively, then we can define a logic given by the
grammar
ϕ ::= Pi | 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) | 〈G〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕm) | 〈H〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕk).
Note that the signature τ in the type of each operator is the same.
Each formula is associated with an arity. The arity of an atomic formula
Pi is the arity of the relation symbol Pi. If H is an operator of the type
(τ, i′′1 , ..., i
′′
k+1), then the arity of 〈H〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕk) is i
′′
(k+1). Let Ar(ϕ) denote
the arity of ϕ. Importantly, in the grammars above, we need the extra
15Obviously the isomorphism takes into account relations in τ as well as the external
relations. Also note that if S ⊆ Ak, then f(S) = { (f(a1), ..., f(ak)) | (a1, ..., ak) ∈ S }.
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condition that for each j, the arity Ar(ϕj) of the formula ϕj in the formula
〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) is ij ; recall that F is an operator of the type (τ, i1, ..., in+1).
A similar convention obviously concerns the operators G and H as well.
The semantics of the logic is defined with respect to pointed models(
(A, {Pi}i∈I
)
, a), where A is a τ -model with the domain A, the objects
Pi ⊆ A
Ar(Pi) are relations, and a is a tuple of elements of A. Call M :=
(A, {Pi}i∈I
)
. Let a ∈ AAr(Pi) and b ∈ AAr
(
〈F 〉(ϕ1,...,ϕn)
)
. The semantics
of atomic formulae asserts that (M,a) |= Pi iff a ∈ Pi. The semantics of
compound formulae asserts that (M, b) |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff we have
b ∈ F
(
A, ||ϕ1||
M , ..., ||ϕn||
M
)
,
where ||ϕi||
M = { v ∈ AAr(ϕi ) | (M,v) |= ϕi }. This system bears some
resemblance to the Scott-Montague semantics of modal logic.
This approach to logic is very general. To see why, consider operators of
the type (∅, 1, ..., 1). The related logic is interpreted by pointed models of the
type ((W, {Pi}i∈I), w), where W is a nonempty set, w ∈W and Pi ⊆W for
each i. Call M := (W, {Pi}i∈I). We may consider W to be an abstract set
of atomic semantic objects, and the subset ||ϕ||M ofW is the semantic value
(or meaning) of the formula ϕ in the model M . Importantly, there is great
freedom in the choice of operators F considered. However, each operator F is
compositional in the sense that the semantic value ||〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)||
M of the
formula 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) is functionally determined by F from the semantic
values ||ϕ1||
M , ..., ||ϕn||
M of the formulae ϕ1, ..., ϕn. Our framework provides
a general approach to compositional operators.
Let us next consider operators of the type (τ, 1, ..., 1), where τ is no more
necessarily the empty signature. We have formulae of the type 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn).
Can we consider the semantics of our logic from the point of view of Kripke
semantics? We can indeed. Let M be a τ -model with the domain W . Call
M :=
(
M, {Pi}i∈I
)
. Our semantics dictates that (M,w) |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)
iff
w ∈ F
(
M, ||ϕ1||
M , ..., ||ϕn||
M
)
.
Let X ⊆W . Define
1. M,X |= Pi iff X = Pi.
2. M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) if and only if there exist sets Y1, ..., Yn ⊆ W
such that X = F (M, Y1, ..., Yn) and M,Yi |= ϕi for each i.
16
We call this the canonical lift of the logic to the level of teams. We can now
(consistently) redefine the satisfaction of 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) such that (M,w) |=
〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff there exists some set X ⊆ W such that w ∈ X and
M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn).
16Notice that here this condition means simply that M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) if and only
if X = F (M, ||ϕ1||
M , ..., ||ϕn||
M ).
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LetW be the power set ofW . Define the (n+1)-ary relation R ⊆ W(n+1)
such that (X,Y1, ..., Yn) ∈ R iff X = F ((M, Y1, ..., Yn)). Now define the
model M = (W,R, {Si}i∈I), where each Si is the set { Pi } ⊆ W. The
model M is (essentially) a Kripke model with the (n + 1)-ary accessibility
relation R and proposition symbols Si. Consider pointed models (M,X),
where X ∈ W. Following standard Kripke semantics of (polyadic) modal
logic, we make the following definition.
1. (M,X) |= Si iff Xi ∈ Si.
2. (M,X) |= 〈R〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff there exist Y1, ..., Yn ∈ W such that
(X,Y1, ..., Yn) ∈ R and (M, Yi) |= ϕi for each i.
Define a translation such that P ∗i = Si and
(〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn))
∗ = 〈R〉(ϕ∗1, ..., ϕ
∗
n).
We have M,X |= Pi iff (M,X) |= Si and M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff
(M,X) |= 〈R〉(ϕ∗1, ..., ϕ
∗
n). Every operator F gives rise to an accessibil-
ity relation R in the canonical way defined above, and each unary predicate
Pi gives rise to the related unary predicate Si. This way we lift the general
compositional semantics to the realm of Kripke semantics. This way typical
compositional frameworks can be viewed from the point of view of Kripke
semantics.17
For the sake of an example concerning the canonical lift, let F be defined
such that F (M, S, T ) = S ∪ T , i.e., F is the disjunction. Let X ⊆W . Then
M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ϕ2) iff there exist sets Y1, Y2 ⊆ W such that X = Y1 ∪ Y2
and we have M,Y1 |= ϕ1 and M,Y2 |= ϕ2. This is the truth defintion for the
disjunction in modal dependence logic. For the sake of another example, let
G be defined such that G(M, S) =W \S, i.e., G is the negation. LetX ⊆W .
Then M,X |= 〈G〉ϕ iff there exists a set Y ⊆W such that X =W \ Y , and
we have M,Y |= ϕ.
Now consider a logic with only monotone operations F , i.e., if we have
X1 ⊆ Y1, X2 ⊆ Y2, ...,Xk ⊆ Yk, then F (M,X1, ...,Xk) ⊆ F (M, Y1, ..., Yk).
We make the following definition.
1. M,X |= Pi iff X ⊆ Pi.
2. M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) if and only if there exist sets Y1, ..., Yn ⊆ W
such that X ⊆ F (M, Y1, ..., Yn) and M,Yi |= ϕi for each i.
17Notice that various logical equivalence-related similarity relations can be nicely lifted
to suitable bisimulations. Note also that related logics can easily be associated with
natural recursive capacities (for example) in the way done in [19]. Now, the Kripke
structures obtained in this way may not contain all Kripke structures. But, nevertheless,
it is intereting that if all structures were in the class, genuine use of the recursive capacities
(non-locality) would necessarily lead to indeterminacy of truth values somewhere, as shown
in [17]. What then, suffices to guarantee determinacy? This is an intriguing question.
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We call this the monotone canonical lift to the level of teams. We can again
(consistently) redefine the satisfaction of 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) such that (M,w) |=
〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff there exists some set X ⊆ W such that w ∈ X and
M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn). (The consistency is easy to show by first noticing
that the sets Z such that M,Z |= χ, satisfy Z ⊆ ||χ||M .)
As above, we shall interpret this semantics in the style of Kripke. Let
W be the power set of W . Define the (n + 1)-ary relation R ⊆ W(n+1)
such that (X,Y1, ..., Yn) ∈ R iff X ⊆ F ((M, Y1, ..., Yn)). Define the model
M = (W,R, {Si}i∈I), where each Si is this time the set { S | S ⊆ Pi } ⊆
W. Following Kripke semantics, define (M,X) |= Si iff X ∈ Si, and also
define (M,X) |= 〈R〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) if there exists Y1, ..., Yn ∈ W such that
(X,Y1, ...Yn) ∈ R and (M, Yi) |= ϕi for each i. We have M,X |= Pi iff
(M,X) |= Si and M,X |= 〈F 〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) iff (M,X) |= 〈R〉(ϕ
∗
1, ..., ϕ
∗
n).
Thus we have again lifted the semantics from the general compositional
treatment to a Kripke-style treatment.
Intuitively, ordinary Kripke-style treatment (of whatever) involves search-
ing for witnesses in order to satisfy a diamond formula. Much of the fun-
damentality of the framework stems from this. The related function based
treatment on the power set level enables an algebraic approach to the under-
lying Kripke-style approach. And of course the power set level treatement
can again be turned into a treatment that resembles the style of Kripke by
scanning the function on subsets backwards (the new accessibility relation),
and regarding subsets as points. Such approaches are interesting even if the
power set operator does not arise from an ordinary accessibility relation, but
is an arbitrary function on subsets.
Above, a natural intuition behind the team level satisfaction of formu-
lae in the setting without the assumption monotonicity is that the team is
exactly the set of points that satisfy the formula. With the monotonicity
assumption, a natural intuition is that a team satisfies a formula if each
member of the team does. In a sense the double team semantics relates to
both of these intuitions.
It is of course interesting to add further generalized operators to the
setting we have defined. For example, as in [16], we can consider operators
F that map any tuple (M, T1, ..., Tn), to a set S ⊆ W; here Ti ⊆ W = P(W )
for each i. Of course if f : W → U is an isomorphism from (M, T1, ..., Tn)
to (N, S1, ..., Sn), then f(F(M, T1, ..., Tn)) = F(N, S1, ..., Sn); here
f(F(M, T1, ..., Tn)) = { f(S) | S ∈ F(M, T1, ..., Tn) },
where f(S) = { f(s) | s ∈ S }. We can also let F be nullary. Then F simply
maps M to a subset of W (and is obviously invariant under isomorphisms).
Consider formulae of the type 〈F〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn). Define the semantics such
thatM,X |= 〈F〉(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) if and only if X ∈ F(M, |||ϕ1|||
M , ..., |||ϕn|||
M ),
where |||ϕi|||
M = { X ⊆W |M,X |= ϕi }. If F is nullary, thenM,X |= 〈F〉
iff X ∈ F(M).
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We can now define the global disjunction V such that M,X |= 〈V〉(ϕ,ψ)
iffX ∈ |||ϕ|||M∪ |||ψ|||M , and the global negation N such thatM,X |= 〈N〉ϕ
iff X ∈ W \ |||ϕ|||M (recall that W = P(W ), and W is the domain of M
and M). Of course we can also add higher order propositions Q ⊆ W to M ,
if we wish, and then obviously M,X |= Q iff X ∈ Q. We did not consider
generalized operators of this level in the principal sections of this article,
mainly for the sake of simplicity, but also because we wanted to consider
systems where one reasons with teams rather than about teams.
A very large class of operators F satisfies the requirements of the frame-
work we have discussed above, and the approach is general indeed. Let us
consider an example in the spirit of cylindric set algebras. Recall that the
set of all variable symbols is VAR = { vi | i ∈ Z+ }. Let A be a first-order
model whose vocabulary τ consists of relation symbols. Let Aω denote the
set of all ω-sequences of elements of A; ω is of course the smallest infinite
ordinal. Let R ∈ τ be a k-ary relation symbol.18 Let (vi1 , ..., vik ) be a tuple
of variable symbols. Define PR(vi1 ,...,vik)
⊆ Aω to be the relation T ⊆ Aω
such that a ∈ A is in T if and only if the following conditions hold.
1. There exists an assignment s such that A, s |=FO R(vi1 , ..., vik ).
2. We have a(i) = s(vi) for each i ∈ {i1, ..., ik}.
LetA be the set of all atomic first-order formulae of the vocabulary τ . Define
the model MA =
(
A, {Pϕ}ϕ∈A
)
.
Define an operator F∃vi of the type (τ, ω, ω) for each variable vi as follows.
Let B be a τ -model. Let B = Dom(B) and S ⊆ Bω. For an ω-sequence
s ∈ Bω, i ∈ N and b ∈ B, let s[i 7→ b] denote the ω-sequence t ∈ Bω such
that t(i) = b and t(j) = s(j) for each j ∈ N \ {i}. Define
F∃vi( (B, S) ) = { s ∈ B
ω | s[i 7→ b] ∈ S for some b ∈ B }.
Define also the operators F¬ and F∨ such that F¬( (B, S) ) = B
ω \ S and
F∨( (B, S, T ) ) = S ∪ T .
Translate from first-order logic into modal logic as follows.
1. T (R(x1, ..., xk)) = PR(x1,...,xk),
2. T (∃viϕ) = 〈F∃vi〉T (ϕ),
3. T (¬ϕ) = 〈F¬〉T (ϕ),
4. T (ϕ ∨ ψ) = 〈F∨〉(T (ϕ), T (ψ)).
Let s be an assignment that maps to A, and let t ∈ Aω. We say that t
encodes s if for all variables vi in the domain of s, we have s(vi) = t(i).
18The equality symbol can be treated as if it was a relation symbol.
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Let s be an assignment and t ∈ Aω a sequence that encodes s. Now of
course
A, s |=FO ψ ⇔ (A, {Pϕ}ϕ∈A, t) |= T (ψ).
We can of course perform lifts and all that for the obtained system. Dou-
ble team semantics is compositional, and thus we can of course similarly
modalize it also, if we wish.
For the sake of one more example, let W be a nonempy set and R ⊆
W ×W a binary relation. Let Pi ⊆ W , where i ∈ I, be unary relations.
Consider the standard Kripke diamond operation of the type ({R}, 1, 1)
defined such that
F♦
(
(W,R), S
)
= { w ∈W | ∃u ∈W s.t. wRu and u ∈ S }.
Let M = ((W,R), {Pi}i∈I). The monotone lift dictates that M,X |= 〈F♦〉ϕ
iff there is some Y ⊆W such that X ⊆ F♦((W,R), Y ) and M,Y |= ϕ.
A whole new range of possibilities arise from considering generalized
operators that modify the underlying models. Let C denote the class of
isomorphism classes of ordinary pointed Kripke models. Let F be a function
(too large to be a set) from C to P(C). We may define (M,w) |= (F )ϕ iff
there exists a model (N, v) ∈
⋃
F ([(M,w)]) such that (N, v) |= ϕ. Here
[(M,w)] is of course the isomorphism class of (M,w), and
⋃
F ([(M,w)])
is the union of the classes in F ([(M,w)]). Similar operators can of course
be defined for predicate logic. These kinds of generalized modifiers can be
annoyingly strong from the set theoretic perspective.
A rather tame such an operator, i.e., a modifier, is employed in [21]
in order to obtain a Turing complete logic L (see [21] for the syntax and
semantics). A possible reading of an L-formula ϕ states that it is possible to
verify ϕ. Formula ¬ϕ can be considered to state that it is possible to falsify
ϕ, or even that it is possible to disprove ϕ. Note that negation here is a
strong negation; indeed, since L captures recursive enumerability, ¬ cannot
be the contradictory negation.
We can define recursive readings r of formulae of L as follows. For first-
order atoms, we let r(ϕ) := “ϕ.” For atom k, where k is a natural number,
we let r(k) := “k.” For ¬, we let r(¬ϕ) := “it is falsifiable that r(ϕ)” or “it
is refutable that r(ϕ).” For the conjunction, we let r(ϕ ∧ ψ) := “r(ϕ) and
r(ψ).” For ∃x, we define that r(∃xϕ) :=“there exists an x such that r(ϕ).”
For Ix, we let r(Ixϕ) :=“it is possible to insert a fresh x such that r(ϕ).”
Operators concerning the insertion and deletion of tuples of relations can
be given a similar reading. For kϕ, we let r(kϕ) := “ this statement—call it
k—holds and asserts that r(ϕ),” or even “ this statement k holds and asserts
that r(ϕ).” (Note that indeed the novel variables k refer to formulae and can
can be associated with the word “this” (this formula...). Now, importantly,
we read A, f |=+ ϕ as “it is verifiable in A, f that r(ϕ)” rather than “it is
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true in A, f that r(ϕ).” Similarly, A, f |=− ϕ is read as “it is falsifiable in
A, f that r(ϕ).”
On the interpretational level, verifiability of verifiability means verifia-
bility, and falsifiability of falsifiability means verifiability. This is dictated by
the formal semantics of L. (So the picture is in a sense more symmetric than
with intuitionistic logic, and strongly corresponds with Turing computation,
with verification being halting in an accepting state and falsifiability halt-
ing in a rejecting state; indeterminacy corresponds to divergence. The logic
gives a unified perspective on logic and computation, using games (game-
theoretic semantics). If considered a canonical logic, it shows that the logical
operators missing from first-order logic (in order to be Turing-complete and
thus capture systematicity) are recursion and quantification of new points
and tuples.)
The reading of the liar’s sentence 1¬1 (which is a formula of L) is now (in
a simplified form according to the reading r) “this statement is falsifiable,”
where falsifiability means falsifiability or refutability or even disprovability
(in a model) in the sense of L. The truth value of 1¬1 in L is indeterminate.
The statement “this statement is falsifiable” is (in the sense of L and even
in some informal senses) unproblematic (not paradoxical). Even informally
the sentence “this statement is falsifiable” can be considered unproblematic
because one cannot now deduce a contradiction in exactly the same way as
in the case of the classical reading of the liar’s sentence. Call ϕ := “this
statement is falsifiable.” If we assume ϕ is true, we obtain a contradiction,
and then if we conclude that therefore ϕ is false, we cannot infer that thus
ϕ is true. We can simply infer that “it is false that this sentence called ϕ is
falsifiable.” It does not (have to) imply that ϕ is true. All this is consistent
with ϕ being indeterminate. So the usual problem does not arise.
Bivalence leads to problems with the liar’s paradox. Consider the rather
classical readings r′ for L such that r′(¬ϕ) := “not r′(ϕ),” r′(kϕ) := “this
statement, call it k, holds and asserts that r′(ϕ),” and r′(k) := ”k holds.”
With this reading, 1¬1 gives the liar’s paradox; now ¬ is “not” as opposed
to asserting falsifiability. With the reading r, the paradox does not really
arise, and the formal semantics of L dictates that the formula is simply
indeterminate, as we discussed above. Thus the paradox is resolved with the
falsifiability reading due to refusing to adopt the bivalent perspective and
talking about verification/falsifiaction rather than simply truth/falsity. If
the truth value of condition k depends solely on “the truth value of condition
k” (with k uninterpreted), we do not have to adopt a reductionist perspective
that we can dig the truth value of the statement k from some foundational
fully determined atomic layer of bivalent facts. We have not defined k,
and undefined statements are ontologically indeterminate. If the meaning of
dsfsd is defined simply to be the meaning of dsfsd, then we can refuse that
it has a conventional meaning that can be understood directly or in some
sufficiently clear reductionist fashion. We have not defined what it is, and
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we could define it in any way we wish. Thus it has no meaning.
Note that L is still bivalent on fragments of L where formulae are de-
terminate, such as first-order logic. Being Turing-complete, L captures the
notion of systematicity (which we here equate with the capacity of Turing
machines, partly because we lack any better definition for systematicity).
Arguably, systematicity is exactly what logic is, meaning that the word (or
the notion of) logic means exactly systematicity. But this position of course
can be debated.
So, L is not bivalent, just like Turing machines are not. The logic L
takes seriously the perspective that bivalence breaks (or can naturally be
considered to break) in the presence of indeterminacy. But does the lack
of bivalence stem from ontic or epistemic indeterminacy? One can argue
that 1¬1 is indeterminate in some ontological sense, whereas a formula of L
that takes as inputs that represent Turing machines (plus input) and tries to
classify whether the input halts, is indeterminate in an epistemic sense. (It
is easy to write a formula of L which attempts to classify Turing machines
according to halting as follows. The formula approximates the assertion that
the input to the formula (a model encoding a Turing machine and an input
to it) halts. The formula is sound and complete for halting inputs, always
being verifiable on halting inputs, but the evaluation of the formula soundly
stops in a rejecting state only on some of the diverging inputs. Thus the
formula misses some false inputs and the game goes on without an end there.
The formula is epistemically indeterminate on those models, at least with
respect to the desired meaning of the formula that would fully classify halting
and diverging (which is impossible). But of course it is debatable whether
the desired meaning of the formula is the true meaning of the formula. We
could dictate that it is not and that the formula is always indeterminate in
an ontic way when it is indeterminate formally.)
Reductionist approaches are fine when we can always reach bivalent
atoms. But who is to say that I am forced to admit that either ∃x(x ∈ x) is
true or that ∃x(x ∈ x) is false? (Forget about ZFC here.) Falsity here (in
the above sentence) does not refer to the contradictory negation of truth.
As we discussed above, genuine indeterminacy about definitions concerning
partially determined notions seems to appear here. Let w and w′ be two
possible worlds such that ∃x(x ∈ x) is true in w and false in w′. Then
my model {w,w′} does not satisfy ∃x(x ∈ x). Whether my model satisfies
¬∃x(x ∈ x), depends on my reading of ¬. Indeed, it is neither unnatural
nor uncommon to read ¬ such that ¬∃x(x ∈ x) means that ∃x(x ∈ x) is
determinately false, i.e., that ∃x(x ∈ x) is false in both w and w′.19 Then
my model does not satisfy ¬∃x(x ∈ x), and thus there is a truth value gap.
19Such readings of ¬ seem to occur in contexts where natural language is used. On the
other hand, in informal situations, the possibility of indeterminacy is very rarely assumed.
The assumption of determinacy indeed anyway seems to lead to many kinds of seemingly
paradoxical situations.
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Strong negation is indeed a natural operator, which has natural uses in con-
texts involving indeterminacy. And indeterminacy itself can appear rather
natural.
As already mentioned, we cannot decide the truth value of condition k if
the truth value of condition depends solely on “the truth value of k.” This
happens in k¬k and kk. The negation in L is one kind of a strong negation,
and, indeed, it arises naturally in L largely due to indeterminacy. Fur-
thermore, as already mentioned, negation in L cannot be the contradictory
negation.
A further direction that L could and should be developed concerns
games. It would be interesting to extend L by quantifiers Qpx for p ∈ P,
where P is a set of players. This would result in a multiplayer version of
L, which currently has only the two players ∃ and ∀. (Indeed, Abramsky
has suggested such quantifiers.) Additionally, the operators that modify the
model could also be associated with more players. Obviously the looping
constructs would be kept in the system. Each player would be associated
with quantifiers that add and delete domain points and tuples of relations.
Arguably, the system could be considered to be a framework that (at
least in some reasonable sense) captures all perfect information games, or
defines the notion of a game. Turing completeness would be part of the
argument claiming that in some sense all games are captured. Indeed, the
system would be all about a group of agents modifying a relational structure
together. Quantifiers Qax would simply color individual nodes. Similarly,
quantifiers that add tuples to, say, a unary relation, would color subsets of
the domain. Other operators would add (delete) domain points and tuples
of relations of higher arities.
A framework where relational structures are modified, possibly infinitely
long, is a rather general framework. Our system would (and will) indeed be a
very general and flexible framework for modeling interaction. Additionally,
the system will nicely build on the logic L, being, after all, a rather direct
generalization of L. The logic L unifies logic and computation using games;
the extension will unify, in a sense, logic, computation and games.
To model concurrency, it could be interesting to allow for simultaneous
moves by the players, with conditions dictating what happens with clashing
move attempts. Also imperfect information could be added in one way or
another.
Generalized modifiers facilitate the definition of the rather natural and
intriguing Turing complete logic L, and surely they also offer rather inter-
esting and intriguing perspectives on logic. Further possiblities concerning
such operators should be investigated. For example theories of arithmetic
that talk about classes of finite models, as opposed to talking about the sin-
gle model (N,+, ·) (possibly together with its non-standard variants), would
be interesting in this context. In the spirit of graph theory, one would talk
about, e.g., finite models that represent initial segments of arithmetic. Also
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finite models encoding finite sets, of course, would be interesting here.
Let us finish up by considering ordinary modal dependence logic and
its variants. A natural generalized version of the modal dependence atom
= (p1, ..., pk, q) is defined as follows. Let (k1, ..., kl) be a nonempty sequence
of positive integers. (We consistently ignore the possibility of considering
operators without explicit input objects.) Let Q be a generalized quantifier
of the type (1, ..., 1), where 1 is repeated 1 + Σi∈{1,...,l}ki times. Consider a
formula of the type AQ(p1, ..., pl), where pi is a sequence of ki proposition
symbols. Define M,X |= AQ(p1, ..., pl) iff (W,X, ||p11||
M , ..., ||plkl ||
M ) ∈ Q.
Here W is the domain of M and X ⊆W a team. Obviously pij denotes the
j-th proposition symbol of proposition symbol sequence pi, and ||pij||
M ⊆W
is the set of possible worlds where pij is true in the classical sense. We could
define for example an idependence operation I(p, q) such that I(p, q) holds
in a team iff the following holds: if p and q get some truth values in a world
w in the team, then there is a world in the team where p gets the same value
as in w and q the opposite value as in w. And so on.
Ordinary dependence logic currently calls for further investigation con-
cerning interpretation. M,X |= p ∨ q can be interpreted to state that the
statement p ∨ q holds in every possible world in the team X. Also the
formula = (p, q) has a natural interpretation in a team. But what does
=(p, q)∨ =(p, q) exactly mean? Indeed, it seems that putting together de-
pendence atoms and the splitjunction is problematic. The connective ∨
is very intuitive in restriction to plain propositional logic, and dependence
atoms are intuitive on their on, but the combination of these is somewhat
puzzling. The formula =(p, q)∨ =(p, q) is, indeed, a validity, while its direct
translation into natural language (with ∨ translated to the word “or”) seems
not to be. With =(p, q) and =(p, q)∨ =(p, q) not being equivalent, ϕ ∨ ψ
seems to be in general best translated into a statement that the possible
situations split or divide into cases such that in the first scenario we have ϕ
and in the other scenario ψ.20
Also, the standard interpretation of ¬=(p, q) is somewhat odd, being true
iff the interpreting team is empty. Thus it is possible to construct sensible
models and teams where for example the formula ¬=(P 6= NP, It is raining)
is not true. Therefore, it is easy to see that formulae cannot be directly
translated into natural language (with ∨ translated to “or” and ¬ to “not”,
and with the atomic proposition symbols being suitably tame) such that
all the resulting natural language statements can be given an interpreta-
tion that exactly corresponds to the formal semantics of the untranslated
formulae. Note that of course already in first-order logic, the symbol ∨ is
20 Ordinary dependence logic and IF logic also have a similar feature. The sentences
∀x∀y =(x, y) and ∀x∀y(=(x, y)∨ =(x, y)) are not equivalent, and in a model with two
elements, one satisfying P and the other one not, the formula ∀x
(
∃y/x(Px ↔ Py) ∨
∃y/x(Px↔ Py)
)
is true, while the formula ∀x∃y/x(Px↔ Py) is not. From the point of
view of natural language, this can be puzzling, at least if ∨ is taken to translate into “or.”
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the inclusive disjunction, and thus it is very easy to see that already the
translations of first-order sentences to natural language can be immediately
claimed ambiguous. However, in the case of first-order logic, the translations
have some sensible reading that exactly corresponds to the formal semantics
of first-order logic.
Let us consider an alternative approach to dependence (in modal and
propositional contexts) altogether. This approach has the property that
the natural language translations (with ∨ and ¬ translated to “or” and
“not,” respectively) have some sensible reading that corresponds to the for-
mal semantics (as long as the interpretations of the proposition symbols
are suitably tame). Let us extend the syntax of ordinary propositional (or
modal) logic by the formula construction rule =(ϕ1, ..., ϕk , ψ). Note that
here we allow for the arbitrary nesting of the dependence operator =. Let
us interpret the logic using ordinary Kripke models. Let us define that
M,w |= =(ϕ1, ..., ϕk, ψ) iff the set X := { w
′ ∈W | wRw′ } of successors of
w satisfies the condition
∀u, v ∈ X
(
∀i(M,u |= ϕi ⇔M,v |= ϕi) ⇒ (M,u |= ψ ⇔M,v |= ψ)
)
.
Here we simply relativise the old dependence condition to the set of suc-
cessors of w. In the similiar spirit, ϕ holds at w iff all successors of w
satisfy p. Now =(ϕ1, ..., ϕk , ψ) holds at w if the set of all successors of w
satisfies the dependence condition. The interpretation of this semantics is
similar to the interpretation of . The set of possible worlds, or situations,
or whatever, must satisfy something. Under this interpretation, dependence
is interpreted with respect to the same sets of worlds as necessity and pos-
sibility. Of course a different accessibility relation could be used, if desired,
but in several contexts it is natural to argue that the very same accessi-
blity relation is appropriate. Anyway, a set of possible worlds is used for
the interpretation, as in ordinary modal dependence logic, but this time the
set involved is quite explicitly associated with the set of possible alternative
situations. Other operators can of course be treated similarly. Examples
of natural operators include for example operators corresponding to inde-
pendence declarations, and for another example, operators asserting that
most successors (in the finite and in general) satisfy p, and thus capturing
an approach to the notion of likelyhood.
The approach resembles Kripke semantics and talks about possible worlds
(or sets of possible worlds: it is natural to define, just like in Kripke seman-
tics, thatM |= ϕ iffM,w |= ϕ for all w in the domain ofM). Trivially, if we
have ♦ and =() in the language together with the Booleans, we (typically)
would like the formulae =(ϕ,ψ) and ¬
(
♦(ϕ∧ψ)∧♦(ϕ∧¬ψ)
)
∧¬
(
♦(¬ϕ∧ψ)∧
♦(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)
)
to be equivalent. (Modal dependence logic does not respect
this.)
This new approach to modal logic with dependence declarations is inter-
preted with pointed modelsM,w; modelsM,X, where X is a team, are not
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needed. The Boolean connectives have their usual meaning (no splitjunc-
tions). Just like ordinary modal logic, this framework is realist in spirit (as
opposed to antirealist); the evaluation point w is considered to be the actual
world. (For example the formula p∧¬p can be interpreted to mean that p
holds while it is conceived necessary that ¬p.) Interestingly, it seems rather
natural to interpret =(p, q)∨ =(p, q) under this new semantics; in team
semantics the formula has a somewhat less natural meaning. Recall that
M |= χ iff M,w |= χ for every w in the domain of M . Let W be the domain
of M . The conditions M |= =(p, q)∨ =(p, q) and M |= ¬ =(r, s) give a
sensible interpretation to the natural language statements corresponding to
=(p, q)∨ =(p, q) and ¬ =(r, s). The interpretation via team semantics (i.e.,
∨ being the splitjunction and ¬ =(r, s) being true only in the empty team,
and the team under investigation being the domain of M) is not natural.
Now consider the formula p → =(r, s). Let us consider the correspond-
ing natural language assertions “If p then r determines whether s.” For
example, let p assert that “the road is free of cops, ” r that “John takes the
motorcycle, ” and s that “John will arrive on time. ” Consider a suitable
Kripke modelM with the domain containg a set of possible worlds w1, ..., w5
as follows.
1. M,w1 |= p ∧ r ∧ s.
2. M,w2 |= p ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s.
3. M,w1 |= ¬p ∧ r ∧ s.
4. M,w1 |= ¬p ∧ r ∧ ¬s.
5. M,w1 |= ¬p ∧ ¬r ∧ ¬s.
Consider the accessibility relation R to be the total binary relation (universal
relation); this is for many purposes the most natural choice. Now, it is not
the case that M |= p → =(r, s). However, the interpretation of p → =(r, s)
via Kripke semantics is still sensible; it states that the formula is valid in
a model if in every possible world where p actually holds, it is conceived by
the observer that r determines s.
However, a more natural reading of p → =(r, s) would be given if the
implication was interpreted to be the operator→> defined such thatM,w |=
ϕ→> ψ iff M ′, w′ |= ψ for all w′ ∈ domain(M ′), where M ′ is the submodel
of M containing exactly the worlds w′′ of M such that M,w′′ |= ϕ. (We
concentrate here primarily on the case where the accessibility relation is
always the total relation on the domain of the model, and thus not really
even needed. We let natural language statements χ correspond to M |= χ
rather than M,w |= χ.) The operator →> gives nice interpretations for
some examples with nested implications and a diamond, for example to
(p →> (q →> ¬♦r)) where the standard strict implication ((p → (q →
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¬♦r))) can be weird (even when we use the total accessibility relation). (For
example, if x is greater than 3, then, if x is a prime, it is not possible that x
is even.) The strict implication (with total accessibility) gives a bad reading.
To give a simpler example, let s state that x is odd (and let p state that
x is greter than 3 and q that x is a prime number). The implication chain
(p →> (q →> s)) is more natural than the one with the strict implication
((p → (q → s)). The intended model here of course corresponds to the
collection of all possible assignments of values to x in N. (Other examples
where standard Kripke semantics with the total accessibility relation can be
considered unintuitive (with respect to some interpretations of ♦) involve
for example the possible scenario where ♦(p ∧ ♦¬p) is valid in every point
of a Kripke model.)
The implication ϕ→> ψ is similar to ¬ϕ∨ψ in team semantics (modal
dependence logic); now we let ϕ be a standard propositional logic formula.
But with a lax ∨ one gets too many possible worlds to the left hand side
team; for example, when evaluating ¬p ∨ ψ, we can split V to U and U ′
such that U |= ¬p and U ′ |= ψ, with U ′ still containing some worlds that
do not satisfy p. Thus ¬p is still true in some possible worlds in U ′. It
is easy to construct examples where this does not go well with the intu-
ition of the statement that “if p, then ψ” (use modal statements in ψ, or
dependence/independence statements, etc.). But of course →> as such is
probably sometimes rather weird as well. Finally, yet one more alternative
for→> could be defined, now in team semantics, such that T |= (ϕ→ ψ) iff
S |= ψ, where S = {u ∈ T | {u} |= ϕ}. Here T , S and {u} are teams. This
connective is faithful to the phenomenon that implications relativise (in one
way or another) to all those possible scenarios where the antecedent holds.
Diamonds are of course related to implications (see below), and the related
diamond here would be defined such that T |= ♦ϕ iff {u} |= ϕ for some
u ∈ T . A slight variant of→ above could replace S with {u ∈W | {u} |= ϕ},
where W is the set of all valuations (also ones not in T ). This implications
works here and there...
Possible worlds provide a fruitful approach to developing the semantics
of implications and other logical operators, but work remains to be done. A
rather natural possibility is to let the nesting depth of (some) operators dic-
tate the meaning of a formula in the type hierarchy. For example the truth
of ♦ =(p, q) can be determined with respect to the set of teams conceived;
a suitable team satistying =(p, q) is searched from there. A formula with
nesting depth three involves sets of sets of teams. (Conjunctions of formulae
with different nesting depths may need adjusting, depending on the formal
details desired.) Many operators, like the implication, possibility, dependen-
cies, the word “unless,” etcetera, can be modelled with more or less success
in this way.
The logic with the Kripke-style reading of atoms =(r, s) where the ac-
cessibility relation is always the total binary relation, is rather natural. It is
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of course a syntactically closed logic (free nesting of dependence operators
and no negation normal forms). The logic can, however, be simulated (with
the same expressivity on the level of models/teams) by a system based on
extended team semantics that has the following grammar.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ∼ϕ | (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) | (ϕ1 ⊔ ϕ2).
Here a team W satisfies p (or W |= p) iff p is true at every point w ∈ W .
The conncective ∨ is the standard splitjunction and ∼ is the negation such
that W |= ∼ϕ iff W 6|= ϕ. The connective ⊔ is the disjunction such that
W |= ϕ ⊔ ψ iff we have W |= ϕ or W |= ψ. The novel negation ¬ can
be interpreted such that W |= ¬ϕ iff for every w ∈ W we have {w} 6|= ϕ.
Intuitively this kind of a negation can be considered to occur for example
in the assertion that “the days were not rainy,” or that “it was never rainy”
(rather than that “it is not the case that the days were rainy”) and similar
inner negations. Thus both disjunctions and both negations have natural
uses in natural language. (The splitjunction intuitively states that each
world satisfies at least one of the disjuncts, such as in “it was raining or
shining,” rather than “it was raining or it was shining,” where in both cases
the talk is about multiple days. The splitjunction corresponds to the the
inner reading mode.)
Repeating an argument from [16, 20], the principle of excluded middle
can be investigated easily with this logic. Consider the natural language
counterpart of the statement x = 5 ∨˙ ¬˙x = 5 where ¬˙x = 5 is to be read
“x is not 5” while ∨˙ is to be read “or.” Now, it is easy to argue that in
a reasonable sense “¬˙x = 5” does not hold, as we assume x is not defined
in any way.21 Concluding from this that “x = 5“ holds would of course be
unjustified; the claim “x = 5“ can also be argued—rather reasonably—not
to hold. Thus the claim “¬˙x = 5 ∨˙ x = 5” is not justified and arguably
does not to hold. To fully understand the reasoning above, define the set
of all possible worlds to be the set W of all functions from an infinite set
of variables into N, i.e., W is the set of variable assignments. We consider
there to be no actual world; x is simply undefined. We repeat the above
reasoning: “¬˙x = 5” is interpreted to stand for W |= ¬˙x = 5, “x = 5” is
interpreted to stand for W |= x = 5, and the claim “x = 5 ∨˙ ¬˙x = 5” is
interpreted to mean W |= (x = 5 ⊔ ¬˙x = 5), which is false. Note that we
can reasonably interpret “¬˙x = 5” to mean that W |= ¬x = 5. Alltogether,
“x = 5 ∨˙ ¬˙x = 5” then claims that W |= x = 5 ⊔ ¬x = 5, which is
indeed false despite the natural language reading we gave it. Of course the
reading W |= x = 5 ∨ ¬x = 5 gives a true statement, and this reading also
makes good sense. Other readings of the natural language statement are
also possible, such as W |= x = 5⊔ ∼ x = 5, which is of course also true
21Indeed, the excluded middle is very interesting in the context of undefined (or not
fully defined) statements.
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because W |= ∼ x = 5. There is nothing very nontrivial about all this
(before or after analysis).
If the set of proposition symbols considered is finite, this logic can define
all sets of teams (when repetitions of equivalent propositional assignments
are ignored and the empty team is included in all definable sets), just like
S5 (universal modality) or the version of S5 with the dependence operator
instead of a diamond. Dependence and independence (etc.) operators can
be added. (Also the modal logic version can accommodate independence
atoms etc.). If desired, ¬ can also be defined such that W |= ¬ϕ iff for all
nonempty subsets U of W , we have U 6|= ϕ; then another interesting system
arises. These negations concern concepts such as “never,” with possibly a
non-temporal reading corresponding to impossibility.
The second reading of ¬ϕ is related to it never becoming conceivable
that ϕ, while the first reading is related to the assertion that ϕ simply never
can be true. These could be characterized as the subjective and objective
reading. It is worth pointing out that ¬ (with both readings) is related
to the denial of the possibility that ϕ. Thus one can define, for example,
W |= ♦ϕ iff for some w ∈W , we have {w} |= ϕ. Notice that now the empty
team does not satisfy ♦ϕ. The next obviously natural operator has been
first published in the first-order context in a paper of Galliani. Ro¨nnholm
has defined and studied the variant of it (also in the propositional and modal
context) that forces truth in the empty team. We define W |= ♦′ϕ iff for
some nonempty U ⊆ W , we have U |= ϕ. We do not bother ourselves now
with the issue of the empty team, even though it is important. Instead, we
note that implication and possibility are intuitively interrelated such that for
the operators ♦,→,¬,∧,⊥ (where these operators are not associated with a
formal semantics) one would typically like to have a semantics where ϕ→ ψ
is equivalent to ¬♦(ϕ∧¬ψ), and furthermore, ♦ϕ is equivalent to ¬(ϕ→ ⊥).
This of course suggests (for example) the implication such that W |= ϕ→ ψ
iff ({w} |= ϕ ⇒ {v} |= ψ) for all u, v ∈ W . Obviously also the necessity
operator W |= ϕ iff {u} |= ϕ for all u ∈ W arises naturally. Finally, it
is worth noting that while ♦′ is cool, it is of course not without interesting
exotic features, because for example ♦′p ∧ ♦′(∼ ♦′p) is easily satisfiable.
Antirealist approaches are often very natural. A set of possible worlds
(a team) can be interpreted to be a possible perspective in the following
sense. Consider a team {w,w′} with two worlds satisfying exactly the same
propositions, with the exception of p; assume that w satisfies p while w′ does
not. Assume that we are in some sense genuinely free to define whether p
holds or not. For example, p could state that ∃x(x ∈ x). (Forget about
ZFC here.) Then {w,w′}, rather than w or w′, corresponds to our intuitive
perspective. One could add to the framework of possible perspectives also
a team of forbidden worlds. The pair of teams containing a set of possible
worlds and a set of impossible worlds would then be some kind of a per-
spective on reality. The two sets would not have to exhaust the space of all
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worlds. (This would depend on further interpretational issues.) Impossible
worlds can correspond to paraconsistent belief sets. Extended truth value
sets are not much different from complex numbers, and thus they are rather
tame objects really when correctly conseptualised. Just like it is possible to
measure (in a sense) a negative number, for example the weight of a piece
of gold corresponding to debt, it possible to measure complex numbers cor-
responding to for example the length of one side of a rectangular thin plate
of owed gold; if the area is understood to be −1 (due to it corresponding to
debt), the side can be understood to correspond to i.
Developing this approach further, one could begin, for example, with
higher order propositions D(ϕ), where ϕ is a formula of ordinary proposi-
tional logic. A team X would satisfy D(ϕ) iff X satisfies ϕ in the sense
of team semantics. The formula D(ϕ) would read that ϕ is determinately
true. One could then use ordinary Boolean logic with this set of higher order
propositions. Of course the higher order propositions would not have to be
where the type hierarchy stops. One could talk not only about determinacy
(etc.) of primitive statements, but also about determinacy (etc.) of proposi-
tions talking about determinacy, and so on ad infinitum. Dependence would
be an interesting extra ingredient (possibly a fundamental one) in this world
of different senses of the excluded middle, different modes of negation, etc.
There is a trivial Galois connection between syntax and semantics. Let
us use it to investigate the meaning of connectives in team semantics (in a
somewhat rough and sketchy way for now). Let VAR define the countably
infinite set of first-order variables used in first-order logic. Fix a vocabulary
V and let C be a class pairs (M,f), where M is a V -model and f a function
f : VAR → Dom(M). A team could be any subclass of C. We could now
define systems of semantics for these kinds of teams and suitable logics,
but let us do something a bit more particular. Let L be a fragment of
first-order logic. For each class S ⊆ L of formulae, let t(S) be the class
{χ ∈ L |S |=C χ }. (Note that t(S) generally contains open formulae as well
as sentences.) For each class D ⊆ C, let c(D) be the class { M ∈ C | M |=
χ for all χ ∈ t(D) }, where t(D) = { χ ∈ L |M |= χ for all M ∈ D }. Define
U to be the structure (U,⊆), whose domain U is the class {c(D) | D ⊆ C }.
Define also the structure T = (Ud,⊆), where Ud is the class { t(S) | S ⊆ L }.
(The contradictory theory and empty class are there.)
We then define a semantics for first-order formulae (ignoring quantifiers
and negation for the time being for the sake of simplicity). Let u ∈ U and
χ ∈ L. Define (U,⊆), u  χ iff we have M |= χ for all M ∈ u. Similarly,
let T ∈ Ud, and define (Ud,⊆), T  χ iff we have T |= χ. We note that
(U,⊆), u  χ ∨ ψ iff there exist u1, u2 ∈ U such that (U,⊆), u1  χ and
(U,⊆), u2  ψ and u ⊆ u1 ∪ u2. Similarly, we have (U
d,⊆), T  χ ∨ ψ
iff there are T1, T2 ∈ U
d such that (Ud,⊆), T1  χ and (U
d,⊆), T2  ψ
and T ⊇ t(T1 ∩ T2). Thus there is an obvious choice (concerning formal-
ism) depending on whether it is desired that information sets (theories)
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grow or classes of possible models shrink. Nice modal operators (quite
like in intuitionistic logic and S4) can be defined and (meta)logical connec-
tives (contradictory negation, and all that discussed above) added. Forcing
systems and lattice-based approaches indeed have a lot of (rather simple
and obvious) explanatory power here. Generalized atoms (in addition to
basic modalities) provide an especially interesting (meta)logical ingredient
that could be added. An obvious collection of modalities to be added are
given by operators such as 〈ψ〉 which adds ψ to the theory considered and
moves to the obtained theory. Any nice new axioms for ZFC? How about
∃x∃y∃z(x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ z ∧ x 6∈ z), justified by ∅, {∅} and {{∅}} of course, and
why not ∀x∃y∃z(x ∈ y ∧ y ∈ z ∧ x 6∈ z), justified by X, {X}, {{X}}.
12 Concluding remarks
We have defined the notions of a generalized atom and minor quantifier,
and we have shown how these notions can be used when defining extensions
and variants of dependence logic. We have seen that double team semantics
can accommodate such extensions and variants under the same umbrella
framework in a natural way. We have established that double team seman-
tics has a natural game-theoretic counterpart and discussed issues related
to interpretation of logics based on team semantics. We have put double
team semantics into use by defining the extension DC2 of D2 with counting
quantifiers. We have shown that the satisfiability and finite satisfiability
problems of DC2 are complete for NEXPTIME.
Obvious interesting future questions involve investigating logics that mix
different minor quantifiers and generalized atoms. It will also be interesting
to see how natural generalized atoms are in logical investigations. Phenom-
ena that appear strange arise easily in logics that belong to the family of
independence-friendly logic, often because technical operators are carelessly
associated with intuitions that arise from the use of the same symbols in
first-order logic. Signaling (see [23]) is an example of such a phenomenon.
It remains to be investigated what kinds of systems embeddable in the dou-
ble team semantics are natural, and up to what extent. For example the
notion of negation calls for further analysis in this context.
There already exists a wide range of papers on logics based on team se-
mantics. Subtle changes in semantic choices, such as using the lax existential
quantifier instead of the strict one, lead to logics with different expressivi-
ties. To understand related phenomena better, it definitely makes sense to
study systems based on team semantics in a unified framework. The double
team semantics aims to provide such a framework.
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A Formulae for the translation DC2 → FOC2
A.1 Formulae for χ = ∃≥kxα.
Dom(χ) = {x, y}:
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) → ∃
≥kxEUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → ∃xSχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) → ¬∃
≥kx¬EVg
′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → ∃xTχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
Dom(χ) is either of the sets {x}, ∅:
ψ1χ := ∃xSχ(x) → ∃
≥kxEUfα (x),
ψ2χ := ∃xE
Uf
α (x) → ∃xSχ(x),
ψ3χ := ∃xTχ(x) → ¬∃
≥kx¬EVg
′
α (x),
ψ4χ := ∃xE
Vg ′
α (x) → ∃xTχ(x),
ψ5χ := ∀x
(
Sα(x) ↔ E
Uf
α (x)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x
(
Tα(x) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x)
)
.
Dom(χ) is {y}:
ψ1χ := ∀y
(
Sχ(y) → ∃
≥kxEUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → Sχ(y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀y
(
Tχ(y) → ¬∃
≥kx¬EVg
′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → Tχ(y)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
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A.2 Formulae for χ = ∃≥ky α.
Dom(χ) = {x, y}:
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) → ∃
≥ky EUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → ∃y Sχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) → ¬∃
≥ky ¬EVg
′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → ∃y Tχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
If Dom(χ) is either of the sets {y}, ∅, exactly the same formulae ψ1χ, ..., ψ
6
χ
are used as in the case where χ = ∃≥kxα and Dom(χ) is {x} or ∅.
Dom(χ) is {x}:
ψ1χ := ∀x
(
Sχ(x) → ∃
≥ky EUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → Sχ(x)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x
(
Tχ(x) → ¬∃
≥ky ¬EVg
′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → Tχ(x)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
A.3 Formulae for χ = ∃sxα.
Below we let ∃=1x ψ denote the (FOC2-expressible) condition that exactly
one x satisfies ψ.
Dom(χ) = {x, y}:
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) → ∃
=1xEUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → ∃xSχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y)→ ∀xE
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → ∃xTχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
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Dom(χ) is either of the sets {x}, ∅:
ψ1χ := ∃xSχ(x) → ∃
=1xEUfα (x),
ψ2χ := ∃xE
Uf
α (x) → ∃xSχ(x),
ψ3χ := ∃xTχ(x)→ ∀xE
Vg ′
α (x),
ψ4χ := ∃xE
Vg ′
α (x) → ∃xTχ(x),
ψ5χ := ∀x
(
Sα(x) ↔ E
Uf
α (x)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x
(
Tα(x) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x)
)
.
Dom(χ) is {y}:
ψ1χ := ∀y
(
Sχ(y) → ∃
=1xEUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → Sχ(y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀y
(
Tχ(y)→ ∀xE
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → Tχ(y)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
A.4 Formulae for χ = ∃sy α.
Dom(χ) = {x, y}:
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) → ∃
=1y EUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → ∃y Sχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y)→ ∀yE
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → ∃y Tχ(x, y)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
If Dom(χ) is either of the sets {y}, ∅, exactly the same formulae ψ1χ, ..., ψ
6
χ
are used as in the case where χ = ∃sxα and Dom(χ) is {x} or ∅.
Dom(χ) is {x}:
ψ1χ := ∀y
(
Sχ(x) → ∃
=1y EUfα (x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
EUfα (x, y) → Sχ(x)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y)→ ∀yE
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ4χ := ∀x∀y
(
EVg
′
α (x, y) → Tχ(x)
)
,
ψ5χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sα(x, y) ↔ E
Uf
α (x, y)
)
,
ψ6χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tα(x, y) ↔ E
Vg ′
α (x, y)
)
.
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A.5 Formulae for χ = χ1 ∨ χ2
Dom(χ) = {x, y}:
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) ↔
(
Sχ1(x, y) ∨ Sχ2(x, y)
))
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) ↔ Tχ1(x, y)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) ↔ Tχ2(x, y)
)
.
Dom(χ) is any of the sets {x}, {y}, ∅:
ψ1χ := ∀x
(
Sχ(x) ↔
(
Sχ1(x) ∨ Sχ2(x)
))
,
ψ2χ := ∀x
(
Tχ(x) ↔ Tχ1(x)
)
,
ψ3χ := ∀x
(
Tχ(x) ↔ Tχ2(x)
)
.
A.6 Formulae for χ = ¬α
Dom(χ) = {x, y}:
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y) ↔ Tα(x, y)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y) ↔ Sα(x, y)
)
.
Dom(χ) is any of the sets {x}, {y}, ∅:
ψ1χ := ∀x
(
Sχ(x) ↔ Tα(x)
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x
(
Tχ(x) ↔ Sα(x)
)
.
A.7 χ is an atomic formula
χ is a first-order atom and Dom(χ) = {x, y}:
ψ1χ := ∀x∀y
(
Sχ(x, y)→ χ
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x∀y
(
Tχ(x, y)→ ¬χ
)
.
χ is a first-order atom and Dom(χ) is {x}:
ψ1χ := ∀x
(
Sχ(x)→ χ
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀x
(
Tχ(x)→ ¬χ
)
.
χ is a first-order atom and Dom(χ) is {y}:
ψ1χ := ∀y
(
Sχ(y)→ χ
)
,
ψ2χ := ∀y
(
Tχ(y)→ ¬χ
)
.
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If χ is the formula =(x, y), then Dom(χ) = {x, y}. We define
ψ1χ := ¬∃x∃
≥2y Sχ(x, y),
ψ2χ := ¬∃x∃y Tχ(x, y).
If χ is the formula =(y, x), then Dom(χ) = {x, y}. We define
ψ1χ := ¬∃y∃
≥2xSχ(x, y),
ψ2χ := ¬∃x∃y Tχ(x, y).
If χ is the formula =(x) and Dom(χ) = {x, y}, we define
ψ1χ := ¬∃
≥2x∃y Sχ(x, y),
ψ2χ := ¬∃x∃y Tχ(x, y).
If χ is the formula =(x) and Dom(χ) = {x}, we define
ψ1χ := ¬∃
≥2xSχ(x),
ψ2χ := ¬∃xTχ(x).
If χ is the formula =(y) and Dom(χ) = {x, y}, we define
ψ1χ := ¬∃
≥2y ∃xSχ(x, y),
ψ2χ := ¬∃x∃y Tχ(x, y).
If χ is the formula =(y) and Dom(χ) = {y}, we define
ψ1χ := ¬∃
≥2xSχ(x),
ψ2χ := ¬∃xTχ(x).
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